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Abstract	How	does	the	framing	of	immigration	influence	support	for	the	welfare	state?	Drawing	on	research	from	psychology,	specifically	the	notion	of	negativity	bias	and	the	sequencing	of	negative	and	positive	information,	we	argue	that	negative	immigration	frames	undermine	welfare	support,	while	positive	frames	have	little	or	no	effect.	Individuals	take	less	notice	of	positive	frames	and	the	effect	of	such	frames	is	further	undermined	by	the	previous	exposure	to	negative	frames,	which	tend	to	stick	longer	in	people’s	minds.	Our	findings,	based	on	survey	experiments	on	over	9,000	individuals	in	Germany,	Sweden	and	the	UK,	show	a	strong	and	pervasive	effect	of	negative	framing	of	immigration	on	welfare	support.	We	also	find	some	evidence	that	this	effect	is	further	amplified	for	people	who	hold	anti-immigrant	and	anti-welfare	attitudes	or	feel	economically	insecure.	The	effect	of	positive	framing	is	considerably	weaker	and	does	not	strengthen	welfare	support	in	any	of	our	countries.		
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Introduction		In	recent	years	immigration	has	become	a	salient	issue	in	public	debates	in	Europe.	In	no	small	part	this	is	related	to	a	substantial	increase	in	immigration	that	most	affluent	European	countries	have	experienced	since	1990.	In	most	of	these	countries,	the	proportion	of	the	population	that	is	foreign-born	has	increased	considerably	during	this	period,	while	the	recent	refugee	crisis	has	further	added	to	these	pressures.	This	rising	immigration	has	had	profound	effects	on	politics	in	Europe.	The	discourse	of	far-right	parties	has	increasingly	emphasized	the	negative	consequences	of	immigration	for	the	economy	and	society	(Afonso	and	Rennwald,	2018;	Stockemer	and	Barisone,	2017).	Not	only	has	this	trend	been	linked	to	the	electoral	success	of	extreme	right	parties	(Ivarsflaten	2008),	but	it	has	also	reconfigured	mainstream	politics	as	parties	have	tried	to	respond	to	growing	concerns	about	immigration	(Abou-Chadi	2016;	Abou-Chadi	and	Krause	2018).		One	of	those	concerns,	which	has	figured	prominently	in	the	media	and	political	discourse,	is	the	potential	consequences	of	immigration	for	the	welfare	state.	Political	actors	and	the	media	have	focused	heavily	on	the	fiscal	effects	of	immigration,	namely	the	question	of	the	net	impact	of	immigration	on	public	finances.	Consequently,	citizens	have	been	exposed	to	conflicting	messages	with	some	sources	claiming	that	immigrants	are	a	drain	on	public	finances,	while	others	arguing	that	immigrants’	net	contribution	is	positive.	What	are	the	consequences	of	this	debate	for	public	opinion	on	the	welfare	state?	Does	the	exposure	to	negative	frames	of	immigration	undermine	support	for	the	welfare	state,	and	do	positive	frames	have	the	opposite	effect?	Existing	literature	on	the	link	between	immigration	and	the	welfare	state	does	not	offer	a	direct	answer	to	this	question	because	it	focuses	predominantly	on	the	effects	of	the	scale	of	immigration	(e.g.	Alesina	&	Glaeser,	2004;	Brady	and	Finningan,	2014;	Finseraas,	2008),	rather	than	of	the	framing	of	its	costs	and	benefits.	The	general	literature	on	framing	is	helpful	in	so	far	as	it	tells	us	that	people	tend	to	respond	to	frames	(e.g.	Chong	&	Druckman,	2007b;	Haynes	et	al,	2016),	but	its	focus	on	issue	frames	does	not	offer	clear	
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insights	into	the	question	of	how	clearly	valenced	frames	(i.e.	outlining	positive	or	negative	aspects)	influence	public	opinion.	This	paper	aims	to	contribute	to	both	of	these	literatures	by	focussing	on	the	microfoundations	of	the	relationship	between	immigration	and	the	welfare	state.	Information	on	immigration	is	hardly	ever	presented	in	fully	neutral	terms	and	even	information	on	the	stock	or	flows	of	immigrants	is	often	communicated	through	partisan	lenses.	If	we	want	to	understand	how	immigration	affects	welfare	support,	we	need	to	turn	our	attention	to	how	citizens	process	this	information	and	how	in	turn	this	affects	their	welfare	policy	preferences.		To	this	end,	we	draw	on	the	literature	from	psychology,	and	specifically	research	on	negativity	bias	(Kahnemann	&	Tversky,	1979;	Rozin	and	Royzman,	2001)	and	the	sequencing	of	negative	and	positive	information	(Ledgerwood	&	Boydstun,	2014;	Boydstun	et	al,	2017;	Sparks	&	Ledgerwood,	2017).	In	line	with	this	literature,	we	hypothesize	that	negative	frames	regarding	the	impact	of	immigration	undermine	welfare	support,	while	positive	frames	have	little	or	no	effect.	Individuals	take	less	notice	of	positive	frames	and	the	effect	of	such	frames	can	be	further	undermined	by	previous	exposure	to	negative	frames,	which	tend	to	stick	longer	in	people’s	minds.	We	test	this	hypothesis	using	survey	experiments	on	over	9,000	individuals	in	Germany,	Sweden	and	the	UK.	We	focus	on	these	countries	for	two	reasons.	First,	in	each	case,	a	substantial	proportion	of	the	population	is	foreign-born	(12-15%)	and	the	costs	and	benefits	of	immigration	have	been	the	subject	of	heated	political	debates	in	recent	times.	In	the	UK,	immigration	was	a	key	issue	in	debates	leading	up	to	the	EU	Referendum	and	the	subsequent	negotiations	on	the	terms	of	Brexit.	In	Germany	and	Sweden	concerns	about	immigration	have	been	amplified	by	the	2015	refugee	crisis.	The	decision	of	the	German	and	Swedish	governments	to	accept	a	large	number	of	refugees	has	encountered	considerable	opposition	at	home	and	contributed	to	the	growing	success	of	far-right	parties	that	have	campaigned	on	an	anti-immigrant	platform.	Second,	these	countries	depict	the	three	worlds	of	welfare	capitalism	(Esping-Andersen,	1990).	The	institutional	structure	of	the	welfare	regimes	may	influence	how	the	public	perceives	the	link	between	immigration	and	welfare	spending.	Thus,	although	our	theoretical	argument	suggests	that	
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the	negative	framing	of	immigration	will	reduce	support	for	higher	spending	everywhere,	it	is	possible	that	the	level	of	support	will	vary	across	the	welfare	regimes.	The	universal	welfare	regime	in	Sweden	allows	immigrants	comparatively	easy	access	to	benefits.	This	characteristic	may	generate	perceptions	that	immigrants	benefit	disproportionately	from	the	welfare	state	and	thus	generate	higher	levels	of	opposition	to	greater	spending	(c.f.	Fietkau	and	Hansen,	2018;	Hjorth,	2016)	than	in	the	other	two	countries.	The	criteria	for	accessing	benefits	for	immigrants	are	stricter	in	Germany	and	the	UK.		Germany’s	insurance-based	regime	is	also	less	generous	to	those	who	did	not	pay	into	the	system,	while	the	UK’s	liberal	regime	is	less	generous	overall.		Our	analysis	shows	a	strong	effect	of	the	negative	framing	of	immigration	on	support	for	welfare	spending	in	all	three	countries.	Although	there	is	some	evidence	that	this	effect	is	amplified	for	people	who	hold	anti-immigrant	and	anti-welfare	attitudes	or	feel	insecure	about	their	financial	prospects,	on	the	whole	negative	framing	applies	generally	across	the	population.	As	expected,	the	effect	of	positive	framing	is	significantly	weaker	and	does	not	strengthen	support	in	any	of	our	countries.		We	also	find	differences	in	the	size	of	the	effect	across	countries	that	are	in	line	with	our	reasoning	about	the	influence	of	regime	types.	These	findings	have	clear	implications	for	the	politics	of	welfare	reforms	in	Europe.	They	suggest	that,	as	long	as	immigration	remains	one	of	the	key	issues	in	national	politics,	it	might	be	much	easier	to	foster	coalitions	that	support	welfare	state	retrenchment	than	coalitions	that	support	further	expansion	of	the	welfare	state.	
	
1.	Immigration	and	support	for	welfare	spending	
	Since	the	publication	of	Alesina	and	Glaeser’s	seminal	book	(2004),	there	has	been	increased	academic	interest	in	the	relationship	between	immigration	and	the	welfare	state.	Alesina	and	Glaeser	argued	that	racial	and	ethnic	heterogeneity	in	the	US	undermines	support	for	redistribution	and	is	the	main	reason	why	the	US	does	not	have	a	generous	welfare	state.	Minorities,	they	maintain,	are	seen	as	benefiting	disproportionately	from	the	
5 
welfare	state	and	thus	it	is	difficult	to	build	solidarity	and	broad-based	support	for	redistribution.			 Although	this	argument	about	the	trade	off	between	heterogeneity	and	redistribution	has	received	strong	empirical	support	in	the	US,	the	findings	for	Europe	have	been	less	clear.	While	some	studies	find	that	race	or	ethnicity	matter	for	welfare	support	(Harell	et	al,	2016),	others	suggest	a	mediating	impact	of	different	political	and	economic	institutions	(Larsen,	2011;	Mau	and	Burkhardt,	2009).	Commonly,	the	literature	examines	how	the	stock	or	flow	of	immigrant	populations	affects	aggregate	support	for	the	welfare	state.	The	findings	are	far	from	consistent.	Some	analyses	find	evidence	of	negative	effects	of	increased	immigration	on	support	for	redistribution	(Dahlberg	et	al,	2012;	Eger,	2010,	Schmidt-Catran	and	Spies,	2016;	Senik	et	al,	2008).	Others	find	some	support	for	the	compensation	hypothesis,	which	posits	that	higher	immigration	provokes	feelings	of	economic	insecurity	which	increases	support	for	welfare	spending	(Brady	and	Finningan,	2014;	Burgoon	et	al,	2012;	Finseraas,	2008).			A	common	denominator	of	these	studies	is	their	reliance	on	cross-sectional	data,	which	largely	leaves	unspecified	the	causal	mechanisms	behind	individual	attitude	formation.	More	recent	scholarship	has	tried	to	address	this	criticism	by	turning	to	survey	experiments.	These	studies	undertake	a	more	explicit	test	of	the	effect	of	information	about	immigration	on	individual	attitudes	about	the	welfare	state	(Alesina	et	al,	2018;	Naumann	and	Stoetzer,	2017,	Runst,	2017).	However,	in	most	cases	the	focus	is	still	on	the	effect	of	the	size	of	the	immigrant	population	on	welfare	state	support.1	Respondents	are	typically	asked	to	evaluate	the	number	of	immigrants	or	primed	with	the	correct	number	of	immigrants,	and	then	asked	about	their	support	for	the	various	aspects	of	the	welfare	state.	On	the	whole,	these	experimental	studies	find	no	direct	uniform	effect	of	immigration	on	support	for	redistribution,	although	they	suggest	that	the	effect	may	vary	according	to	
																																																													1	Alesina	et	al	(2018)	also	examine	the	effect	of	immigrants’	origin	and	work	ethic.	Similarly,	Ford	(2016)	examines	how	attitudes	towards	the	level	of	benefits	are	affected	by	information	about	recipients’	ethnic	and	religious	background.	
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income,	education	or	the	exposure	to	labour	market	risks	(Naumann	and	Stoetzer,	2017;	Runst,	2017).			One	potential	reason	for	why	these	studies	find	no	strong	effect	of	immigration	is	that	respondents	may	not	see	an	immediate	link	between	immigration	and	redistribution.	Even	if	they	are	made	aware	of	the	number	of	immigrants	in	their	country,	they	may	perceive	that	number	differently	or	may	not	find	that	information	immediately	relevant	when	answering	the	question	about	their	support	for	redistribution.	We	argue	that	a	more	appropriate	assessment	of	the	effects	of	immigration	on	welfare	state	support	is	to	confront	respondents	with	more	direct	information	about	the	economic	costs	and	benefits	of	immigration.	An	explicit	mention	of	immigrants’	fiscal	impact	is	more	likely	to	trigger	considerations	about	the	welfare	state,	whether	that	be	the	sustainability	of	the	welfare	state	(socio-tropic	concerns)	or	higher	taxes	and	competition	for	welfare	services	(self-interest).	Political	actors	and	the	media	are	aware	that	this	type	of	information	elicits	strong	responses	and	use	it	frequently	when	addressing	the	public.	Indeed,	as	Alesina	and	Glaeser	(2004)	have	shown	in	the	case	of	the	US,	information	about	the	costs	of	different	ethnic	groups	has	been	used	instrumentally	by	conservative	politicians	and	media	outlets	to	activate	natives’	racial	prejudices,	undermine	redistributive	policies	and	mobilize	political	support.2		Far	right	parties	in	Europe	have	relied	on	a	similar	strategy	and	tried	to	portray	immigrants	as	exploiting	the	welfare	system.			 Information	about	the	costs/benefits	of	immigration	is	more	likely	to	be	consequential	than	information	about	the	number	of	immigrants	not	only	because	it	makes	the	link	between	immigration	and	redistribution	more	transparent,	but	also	because	it	is	often	presented	through	valenced	frames.	Such	frames	indicate	a	clear	standpoint	and	emphasize	either	negative	or	positive	aspects	of	an	issue.	We	know	from	research	in	psychology	and	communication	studies	that	valenced	frames	tend	to	be	more	effective	in																																																														2	It	is	important	to	recognize	that	some	of	these	prejudices	exist	prior	to	such	information.	Previous	research	shows	that	some	individuals	are	particularly	biased	towards	minorities	and	that,	in	addition	to	economic	concerns	(Malhotra	et	al,	2013;	Schmidt-Catran	and	Spies,	2016),	ethnocentrism	(Harell	et	al,	2016)	and	cultural	concerns	(Hainmueller	and	Hiscox,	2007;	Sides	and	Citrin,	2007;	Valentino	et	al,	2017)	shape	attitudes	towards	immigrants.		
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influencing	attitudes	than	neutral	frames	because	they	present	information	in	a	more	accessible	way	(Baumeister	et	al,	2001;	Chong	and	Druckman,	2007).	Political	actors	and	the	media	regularly	rely	on	valenced	frames	when	discussing	the	economic	effects	of	immigration.	Depending	on	the	source	and	the	methodology	used,	immigration	has	been	portrayed	as	either	being	a	drain	on	the	budget	and	public	services	or	having	a	positive	net	fiscal	contribution.	Yet,	we	know	little	about	the	effects	of	such	frames	on	citizens’	attitudes.	Does	information	about	the	economic	consequences	of	immigration	affect	attitudes	towards	redistribution	and	the	welfare	state?	And	does	valence	of	the	frames	matter?	The	next	section	outlines	our	theoretical	reasoning	and	the	hypotheses	we	test	through	the	survey	experiment.		
2.	Framing	effects	and	negativity	bias		Research	on	public	opinion	has	shown	that	how	political	actors	and	the	media	frame	their	communication	is	consequential	for	citizens’	attitudes.	We	know	that	citizens’	perceptions	are	affected	by	the	way	in	which	the	media	describes	an	issue,	policy	or	candidate	(Chong	&	Druckman,	2007b;	Gross,	2008).	For	example,	a	hate	group	rally	is	perceived	more	favourably	if	it	is	framed	in	terms	of	free	speech	rather	than	as	a	threat	to	public	safety	(Nelson	et	al,	1997a).	Attitudes	towards	government	spending	for	the	poor	depend	on	how	consequences	of	such	policies	are	represented	(Sniderman	and	Theriault,	2004),	while	support	for	aggregate	government	spending	depends	on	whether	support	is	framed	in	general	or	specific	terms	(Jacoby,	2000).		Different	mechanisms	have	been	identified	to	explain	the	effect	of	framing	on	public	opinion.	The	information	in	a	frame	may	induce	learning	and	subsequently	change	an	individual’s	opinion	on	policy.	Alternatively,	a	frame	may	emphasize	certain	considerations	of	an	issue	or	policy,	thus	increasing	their	weight	and	making	them	more	relevant.	Finally,	the	media	and	political	actors	may	also	prime	an	issue	to	bring	associated	beliefs	to	the	forefront	of	consideration	(Haynes	et	al,	2016).		While	this	research	has	demonstrated	that	frames	have	a	powerful	effect	on	public	
8 
opinion,	the	focus	has	been	predominantly	on	issue	frames.	Such	frames	typically	include	different	content	and	thus	make	it	difficult	to	separate	the	effects	of	that	content	from	the	effects	of	valence	alone	(positive	vs	negative)	(Boydstun	et	al,	2017).	Yet,	in	competitive	democracies	citizens	are	often	exposed	to	valenced	frames	that	do	not	necessarily	emphasize	different	aspects	of	an	issue,	but	simply	contain	conflicting	information	that	stress	either	positive	or	negative	consequences.	Information	on	the	fiscal	impact	of	immigration	is	one	such	case.	For	example,	in	the	UK	citizens	have	been	exposed	to	conflicting	messages	from	different	media	outlets.	While	the	Guardian	cited	a	study	which	argues	that	immigrants	contributed	GBP	20	billion	more	in	taxes	than	they	received	in	welfare	payments	over	ten	years	(4	November	2014),	the	Daily	Mail	referred	to	a	study	that	claims	that	the	annual	net	cost	of	immigrants	is	GBP	17	billion	(17	May	2016).	Similarly,	in	Germany	some	outlets	have	emphasized	that	each	foreigner	contributes	EUR	3,300	more	in	taxes	and	premiums	than	they	get	in	terms	of	state	support	(Sueddeutsche	Zeitung,	27	November	2014),	while	others	have	reported	that	on	average	each	foreigner	represents	a	net	cost	of	EUR	1,800	(Bild,	1	February	2015).3		How	do	citizens	respond	to	such	valenced	frames?	Drawing	on	research	from	psychology	and	behavioural	science,	and	in	particular	the	notion	of	negativity	bias,	we	argue	that	the	effects	of	such	valenced	frames	are	assymetric	and	that	negative	frames	have	a	stronger	impact	on	citizens’	attitudes	than	positive	frames.	Psychologists	have	shown	that	under	many	conditions,	humans	have	an	innate	predisposition	to	attend	to	valence	and	to	give	greater	weight	to	negative	than	positive	information	(Baumeister	et	al.	2001;	Rozin	and	Royzman,	2001).	Since	Kahneman	and	Tversky’s	(1979,	1981)	seminal	work	on	prospect	theory,	which	suggests	that	negative	frames	are	more	powerful	than	positive	frames	in	shaping	people’s	judgements,	a	vast	multidisciplinary	literature	has	demonstrated	this	principle	in	a	range	of	domains.	For	example,	public	perceptions	of	the	economy	have	been	shown	to	be	affected	more	strongly	by	negative	than	positive	economic	news	coverage	(Soroka,	2006).	Job	placement	programmes	are	evaluated	more	positively	
																																																													3	The	differences	in	estimates	are	due	to	different	assumptions	used	in	calculations,	but	this	is	rarely	discussed	sufficiently	in	communications	aimed	at	the	general	public.	
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when	they	are	discussed	in	terms	of	their	success	rate	rather	than	their	failure	rate	(Davis	and	Bobko,	1986).	Negative	information	has	been	also	shown	to	have	a	greater	role	with	respect	to	evaluation	of	U.S.	presidential	candidates	and	political	parties	as	well	as	voter	turnout	(Holbrook	et	al,	2001).	Similarly,	negative	political	advertising	has	a	stronger	effect	than	positive	advertising	and	people	tend	to	remember	it	longer	(Johnson-Cartee	and	Copland,	1991).		There	are	several	explanations	for	this	evident	presence	of	negativity	bias.	Some	theories	posit	that	negativity	bias	is	a	built-in	predisposition	or	an	inherent	characteristic	in	the	central	nervous	system.	The	desire	for	survival	implies	that	humans	may	be	genetically	predisposed	to	pay	more	attention	to	negative	events.	In	this	line	of	reasoning,	some	accounts	suggest	that	negativity	bias	operates	automatically	at	an	early	(evaluative-categorization)	stage	of	reasoning	(Ito	et	al.	1998).	Others	argue	that	negative	information	is	more	potent	because	of	the	much	lower	frequency	of	negative	than	positive	events	(Lewick	et	al,	1992).	Yet	others	emphasize	the	contagion	effect	and	argue	that	negative	events	and	information	“	may	inherently	be	more	contagious,	generalize	more	to	neighboring	domains,	and	be	more	resistant	to	elimination”	(Rozin	and	Royzman,	2001:	315).	The	different	possible	reasons	notwithstanding,	extensive	empirical	studies	have	demonstrated	the	dominance	of	negativity	bias	and	the	fact	that	negative	information	is	more	salient	and	more	memorable.	We	therefore	expect	that:	H1:	The	effects	of	the	negative	framing	of	immigration	will	be	more	powerful	than	the	effects	of	the	positive	framing	and	thus	have	a	greater	impact	on	welfare	attitudes.		More	specifically,	we	expect	that:	H2a:	Respondents	exposed	to	the	negative	framing	of	immigration	show	significantly	less	support	for	welfare	spending	than	those	in	the	control	group,	i.e.	those	not	exposed	to	any	information	about	immigration.	People	who	receive	information	about	the	fiscal	costs	of	immigration	should	be	more	likely	to	perceive	immigrants	as	being	the	main	beneficiaries	of	the	welfare	system.	
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This	should	lead	to	reduced	aggregate	support	for	welfare	spending	either	because	of	reduced	solidarity	towards	the	out	group	or	because	of	self-interest	as	the	net	fiscal	burden	of	immigration	may	be	associated	with	potentially	higher	taxes.		If	negative	information	about	immigration	generates	lower	support	for	welfare	spending	relative	to	the	control	group,	should	we	expect	a	reverse	effect	of	positive	information?	Two	reasons	lead	us	to	believe	that	this	is	unlikely	to	be	the	case	and	that	the	effects	of	positive	information	should	be	negligible.	The	first	is	associated	with	the	literature	on	negativity	bias,	which	suggests	that	positive	frames	are	weaker,	less	memorable,	and	thus	less	likely	to	shape	attitudes.	The	second	is	related	to	the	more	recent	literature	in	psychology	that	examines	the	effects	of	the	sequencing	of	positive	and	negative	messages.	This	literature	shows	that	negative	frames	tend	to	be	stickier	than	positive	frames.	They	lodge	in	people’s	mind	for	longer,	so	reframing	from	negative	to	positive	is	more	difficult	than	the	other	way	around	(Ledgerwood	&	Boydstun,	2014;	Boydstun	et	al,	2017;	Sparks	&	Ledgerwood,	2017).	Because	immigration	is	such	a	salient	topic	in	advanced	countries,	our	respondents	are	likely	to	already	have	encountered	some	messages	about	the	fiscal	impact	of	immigration	(Allen	and	Blinder,	2013).	If	negative	information	is	indeed	more	memorable	and	stickier	than	positive	information,	then	respondents	who	were	previously	exposed	primarily	to	messages	that	emphasize	the	negative	fiscal	impact	of	immigration	may	find	it	more	difficult	to	believe	subsequent	information	that	immigrants	contribute	more	to	the	welfare	system	than	they	take	out.	Correspondingly,	we	hypothesize	that:		H2b:	Respondents	exposed	to	the	positive	framing	of	immigration	do	not	show	a	significantly	stronger	support	for	welfare	spending	than	the	control	group.	It	is	important	to	note	here	that	our	understanding	of	the	framing	effect	is	not	the	same	as	persuasion	via	belief	change.	As	Nelson	et	al	(1997b)	show,	although	the	two	concepts	are	related,	they	differ	both	theoretically	and	empirically.	Persuasion	via	belief	change	is	evident	when	respondents	believe	the	information	that	is	discrepant	with	their	prior	attitude,	and	which	then	leads	them	to	change	their	attitudes	accordingly.	The	underlying	rationale	is	that	such	information	affects	opinion	because	it	is	new	and	thus	not	
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already	part	of	the	respondents’	knowledge	or	convictions.	In	contrast,	framing	effects	cannot	be	reduced	to	new	information	only.	Instead,	frames	also	“operate	by	activating	information	already	at	the	recipients’	disposal,	stored	in	long	term	memory”	(ibid,	225).	Frames,	therefore,	may	not	always	offer	new	information,	but	they	influence	people’s	weighting	of	different	considerations	and	the	perceived	relevance	of	a	particular	belief	for	policy	attitudes.	This	conceptualization	of	framing	effects	can	be	verified	empirically.	If	memory	activation	was	not	part	of	the	framing	effects,	the	effect	of	our	negative	framing	would	be	evident	only	among	those	respondents	who	had	no	previous	exposure	to	negative	information	about	the	costs	of	immigration.	While	the	lack	of	resources	prevented	us	from	exposing	our	respondents	to	such	information	prior	to	the	experiment,	data	on	newspaper	readership	offer	a	reasonable	proxy	for	previous	exposure.	Controlling	for	readership	of	newspapers	that	tend	to	propagate	an	anti-immigration	sentiment,	we	find	no	appreciable	difference	in	the	magnitude	of	the	framing	effects	across	the	two	groups	(see	Table	A12	of	the	online	appendix).	This	confirms	the	idea	that	the	framing	effect	entails	weighting	of	both	new	and	previously	acquired	information	and	it	is	not	simply	belief	change	due	to	new	information.		
	
2.	1	Moderating	effects	The	framing	literature	tells	us	that	the	strength	of	the	frame	is	an	important	determinant	of	its	effectiveness	(Chong	and	Druckman,	2007).	Frames	providing	clear	and	unambiguous	information	are	more	easily	accessible	and	thus	more	likely	to	be	consequential	for	attitude	formation.	Because	a	statement	about	the	fiscal	impact	of	immigration	represents	a	strong	frame	and	makes	the	link	between	immigration	and	redistribution	immediately	obvious,	we	expect	to	see	clear	effects	of	this	frame	at	the	aggregate	level.		However,	it	is	possible	that	this	effect	may	be	further	amplified	by	strong	pre-existing	attitudes	or	characteristics.	As	Chong	and	Druckman	(2007b:	120)	argue,	“individuals	who	possess	strong	attitudes	are	not	only	more	likely	to	recognize	which	side	of	an	issue	is	consistent	with	their	values,	but	they	are	also	more	likely	to	engage	in	
12 
motivated	reasoning”,	which	includes	an	inclination	to	evaluate	new	information	in	a	way	that	supports	their	preconception	and	to	devalue	contrary	evidence.	Two	types	of	such	strong	attitudes	seem	especially	important	for	our	study	–	anti-immigrant	and	anti-welfare	attitudes.	Individuals	with	such	attitudes	should	be	particularly	susceptible	to	our	negative	frame	that	emphasizes	the	fiscal	costs	of	immigration.	Those	who	have	clear	anti-immigrant	attitudes	are	more	likely	to	believe	information	that	immigrants	are	benefiting	disproportionately	from	the	welfare	state	and	this	is	likely	to	further	strengthen	those	attitudes.	Consequently,	they	should	be	less	likely	to	support	further	welfare	spending.	Similarly,	among	respondents	who	receive	the	negative	frame,	those	who	are	already	critical	about	the	size	of	the	welfare	state	should	be	especially	reluctant	to	support	an	expansion	of	welfare	benefits	because	such	frame	further	reinforces	their	believes	that	welfare	costs	are	too	high	or	that	many	people	on	benefits	are	not	deserving.	We	believe	that	these	attitudes	capture	better	cognitive	considerations	and	are	thus	more	consequential	than	simple	categories	such	as	education,	income	or	political	leaning.		In	addition,	we	consider	expectations	about	economic	prospects	as	another	factor	that	may	moderate	the	effect	of	our	framing.	Individuals	who	are	worried	about	their	economic	prospects	are	more	likely	to	end	up	being	dependent	on	the	welfare	state	and	thus	may	see	immigrants	as	competition	for	scarce	resources.	Theoretically,	however,	it	is	unclear	whether	such	circumstances	should	amplify	the	effect	of	our	negative	framing.	On	the	one	hand,	such	individuals	may	support	greater	spending	as	they	expect	that	they	will	need	to	rely	on	the	welfare	state	more	heavily	in	the	future.	On	the	other	hand,	they	may	be	less	supportive	of	welfare	spending	if	they	perceive	immigrants	as	non-deserving	or	believe	that	a	leaner	welfare	state	would	be	less	attractive	to	immigrants,	which	in	turn	might	help	reduce	the	perceived	competition	for	welfare.			
3.	The	survey	experiment		To	test	how	the	framing	of	the	impact	of	immigration	affects	support	for	welfare	spending,	we	conducted	survey	experiments	in	Germany,	Sweden,	and	the	United	Kingdom.	Our	
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experiments	were	embedded	in	YouGov’s	regular	Omnibus	surveys.	The	surveys	are	administered	online	and	respondents	are	recruited	from	YouGov’s	panels	of	800,000	members	in	the	UK,	320,000	in	Germany,	and	100,000	in	Sweden.	The	samples	drawn	from	these	panels	are	representative	of	the	national	population	based	on	age,	region,	gender,	education,	political	interest,	and	voting	behaviour	at	the	last	election.	Respondents	are	selected	using	Active	Sampling	to	ensure	that	only	those	contacted	are	able	to	access	the	survey.	The	final	sample	sizes	are	3,269	in	the	UK,	4,158	in	Germany,	and	2,001	in	Sweden.	The	smaller	sample	size	in	Sweden	reflects	the	difficulty	and	cost	of	obtaining	a	large	sample	in	a	country	with	smaller	population.	The	surveys	were	fielded	between	9th	and	12	June	2017	in	the	UK,	14th	and	17th	August	2017	in	Germany,	and	22nd	to	29th	September	2017	in	Sweden.4		 For	the	main	experiment,	all	individuals	were	primed	with	neutral	information	to	prompt	them	into	thinking	about	how	the	welfare	state	is	funded	and	the	relationship	between	taxation	and	welfare	spending:		(Priming	information):	The	government	provides	a	range	of	social	benefits	and	
services	to	address	the	needs	associated	with	unemployment,	sickness,	education,	housing,	
family	circumstances,	and	retirement.	Such	benefits	and	services	are	financed	through	
taxation	and	national	insurance	and	all	legal	residents	in	[country	name]	are	entitled	to	
receive	them.	To	spend	more	on	social	benefits	and	services,	the	government	may	need	to	
increase	taxes	and	national	insurance	contributions.			Individuals	were	then	randomized	into	three	groups.	The	first	group	received	the	information	that	framed	the	economic	impact	of	immigration	on	the	welfare	state	in	a	negative	light:			
																																																													4	The	study	was	deemed	to	be	“minimal	risk”	under	the	terms	of	the	ethical	assessment	procedure	at	[university	name]	(see	p.	32	of	the	online	appendix	for	further	detail).	Following	the	survey,	all	respondents	were	made	aware	that	they	were	part	of	a	survey	experiment.		
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(Negative	frame):	Because	immigrants	are	also	entitled	to	receive	social	benefits	and	
use	public	services,	the	economic	implications	of	immigration	are	an	increasing	
concern.		Recent	research	shows	that	immigration	is	a	drain	on	government	finances	–	
on	average,	immigrants	take	out	significantly	more	from	the	welfare	state	in	social	
benefits	and	services	than	they	contribute	in	taxes	and	national	insurance.		The	second	group	received	exactly	the	opposite	information:	
	 (Positive	frame):	Because	immigrants	are	also	entitled	to	receive	social	benefits	and	
use	public	services,	the	economic	implications	of	immigration	are	an	increasing	
concern.		However,	recent	research	shows	that	immigration	is	in	fact	a	boost	to	
government	finances	–	on	average,	immigrants	contribute	significantly	more	to	the	
welfare	state	in	taxes	and	national	insurance	than	they	take	out	in	social	benefits	and	
services.		The	final	group	serves	as	our	control	group	and	received	only	the	priming	information.		Every	group	was	then	asked	our	dependent	variable	question.	Previous	research	has	shown	that	when	individuals	are	asked	about	increasing	social	spending	without	being	made	aware	of	the	potential	costs,	then	support	for	spending	tends	to	be	overstated	(	Margalit,	2013).	We	therefore	assess	support	for	social	spending	by	referring	to	the	potential	costs	of	any	increase.	The	following	question,	with	five	possible	responses	ranging	from	“strongly	support”	to	“strongly	oppose”,	serves	as	our	dependent	variable:		
Do	you	support	an	increase	in	government	spending	on	social	benefits	and	services	
even	if	this	may	lead	to	higher	taxes?			The	treatment	groups	therefore	differ	only	in	the	framing	information	that	they	received.	Randomization	ensures	that	all	three	groups	are	nearly	identical	(see	Tables	A6-A8)	in	all	other	respects	in	terms	of	observable	and	unobservable	variables	that	may	confound	cross-group	comparison.			
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Strong	pre-existing	attitudes	regarding	immigrants	and	welfare	spending	more	broadly	may	amplify	the	effect	of	our	frames.	Similarly,	those	who	are	less	economically	secure	may	view	immigrants	as	competitors	for	welfare	benefits.	We	therefore	placed,	prior	to	the	treatment,	three	additional	questions	on	the	survey	to	investigate	the	conditional	effect	of	our	frames.	The	wording	for	each	of	these	questions	was	inspired	by	survey	experiments	undertaken	by	Ford	(2016)	and	Margalit	(2013).	The	first	question	measures	the	extent	to	which	individuals	hold	anti-welfare	preferences	that	may	amplify	negative	information	regarding	the	welfare	state.5	The	second	question	is	aimed	at	assessing	pre-existing	anti-immigrant	attitudes.6	The	final	question	is	designed	to	examine	whether	economic	insecurity	could	moderate	our	treatment	effects.7			
4.	Results		Figure	1	shows	the	distribution	of	support	for	increased	welfare	spending.	The	dependent	variable	has	been	recoded	into	three	categories	to	simplify	the	presentation	of	our	results	and	make	the	graphs	more	readable.8	Figure	1	shows	that	there	is	substantial	variation	in	support	for	increased	welfare	spending	both	between	countries	and	between	treatment	groups.	In	general,	support	for	increased	spending	is	highest	in	the	UK	and	lowest	in	Sweden.	At	first	glance,	this	may	be	surprising	given	what	we	know	about	the	respective	welfare	regimes	(Esping-Andersen,	1990).	However,	our	question	asks	respondents	if	they	favor	increased	spending	even	if	it	leads	to	higher	taxes.	In	Sweden,	welfare	expenditure	is	already	high	at	27.1	percent	of	GDP,	compared	to	21.5	percent	in	the	UK	and	25.3%	in																																																														5	To	what	extent	you	agree	or	disagree	with	the	following	statement:	Many	people	who	receive	welfare	benefits	don’t	really	deserve	any	help	(a	five	point	scale	ranging	from	strongly	agree	to	strongly	disagree).	6	On	a	scale	from	0	to	10,	where	0	stands	for	“would	not	mind	at	all”	and	10	stands	for	“would	mind	a	great	deal”,	please	say	how	much	would	you	mind	or	not	mind:	(a)	living	next	door	to	an	immigrant	family?,	(b)	working	with	immigrants?		7	Looking	forward	to	the	next	12	months,	how	confident	do	you	feel	about	being	able	to	keep	your	current	job?	(1.	Very	confident		2.	Confident		3.	Slightly	confident		4.	Not	confident		5.	Not	employed	at	the	moment)	8	In	addition,	methodological	concerns	have	informed	this	decision.	Specifically,	in	our	interaction	models	cell	sizes	at	the	tails	(strongly	support	and	strongly	oppose)	for	particular	attitudes	are	very	small.	For	example,	in	the	UK	in	the	negative	group	among	those	who	hold	anti-welfare	attitudes,	only	20	respondents	strongly	support	increased	spending.		
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Germany.9	Therefore,	it	is	possible	that	Swedish	respondents	broadly	believe	that	spending	is	high	enough	already,	while	UK	respondents	believe	that	there	is	greater	capacity	for	increased	expenditure.	In	addition,	the	UK	has	the	lowest	income	tax	in	all	categories	of	income,	and	hence	the	prospect	of	higher	taxes	as	a	price	for	increased	spending	may	not	appear	so	unacceptable.10	In	any	case,	this	should	not	affect	our	substantive	results	since	we	are	concerned	with	how	framing	changes	support	for	spending	rather	than	the	prevalence	of	support	for	increased	expenditure	in	general.		
	Figure	1:	Support	for	increased	social	spending	by	treatment	group.11		 	While	there	is	a	clear	difference	in	the	overall	level	of	support	for	increased	welfare	spending	across	the	three	countries,	the	pattern	of	support	across	the	treatment	groups	
																																																													9	OECD	(2018),	Social	spending	(indicator).	doi:	10.1787/7497563b-en	(Accessed	on	15	June	2018)	10	See	“Tax	on	test:	Do	Britons	pay	more	than	most”,	Guardian,	27	May	2017.	11	Stata	graph	schemes	designed	by	Bischof	(2017).	
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within	countries	is	remarkably	similar.	Figure	1	also	shows	that	respondents	in	the	control	group	were	more	likely	to	support	an	increase	in	spending	in	each	country.	The	difference	between	the	control	group	and	the	negative	treatment	group	is	largest	in	the	UK	at	13	percentage	points.	In	Sweden	the	difference	is	11	points	and	in	Germany	6	points.	This	provides	preliminary	support	for	our	hypothesis	that	negative	framing	of	the	impact	of	immigration	leads	to	reduced	support	for	welfare	spending.	It	is	also	noticeable	that	individuals	in	the	positive	treatment	group	in	each	country	have	lower	levels	of	support	for	increased	spending	than	the	control	group.	This	may	indicate	that	even	a	mere	mention	of	immigration	triggers	considerations	that	reduce	welfare	support.	This	is	an	interesting	outcome	though	at	this	stage,	it	is	unclear	whether	the	level	of	support	for	increased	spending	among	the	positive	treatment	group	is	significantly	different	to	that	of	the	control	group.	In	the	next	section	we	turn	to	a	more	formal	test	of	our	hypotheses.		
4.1	Regression	models	To	formally	test	our	hypotheses,	we	regressed	our	dependent	variable	on	a	categorical	indicator	of	a	respondent’s	treatment	group.	The	control	group	is	specified	as	the	reference	category.	As	the	dependent	variable	is	categorical,	we	use	an	ordered	logit	model	with	poststratification	weights.	Given	the	experimental	protocol	and	the	fact	that	our	samples	are	weighted	to	be	representative,	spurious	correlation	is	unlikely	to	be	a	problem	in	our	models.	We	therefore	follow	advice	by	Mutz	(2011,	Ch.	7)	to	keep	the	model	simple	and	not	to	include	control	variables.12	In	subsequent	models,	which	examine	the	moderating	effects	of	pre-existing	attitudes,	we	interact	those	attitudes	with	the	treatment.	The	models	are	specified	as	follows:				 𝑌"∗ = 	𝛽' +	𝛽)𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇	𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃 +	𝜀" 		with	𝑌"∗	capturing	individuals’	support	for	increased	welfare	spending,	𝑖	indexing	individuals,	and	𝜀" 	representing	an	error	term.	To	examine	the	conditional	effect	of	pre-
																																																													12	The	results	hold	when	standard	controls	are	included	in	the	models	(see	table	A1	in	the	online	appendix).	
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existing	attitudes	on	our	treatments,	additional	models	are	estimated	containing	the	interaction	terms	𝛽6𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇	𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃	 × 𝐴𝑁𝑇𝐼-𝑊𝐸𝐿𝐹𝐴𝑅𝐸,	𝛽<𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇	𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃	 ×𝐴𝑁𝑇𝐼-𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁,	and	𝛽=𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇	𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃 × 𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑂𝑀𝐼𝐶	𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌.	The	interaction	models	also	contain	all	constitutive	terms.	Separate	models	are	estimated	for	each	country.	The	results	can	be	found	in	Tables	1-3.			 	
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Table	1:	Immigration	Framing	and	Support	for	Redistribution	in	Germany		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)		 b/se	 b/se	 b/se	 b/se	No	frame	(ref.)	 	 	 	 				Negative	frame	 -0.3688***	 -0.1419	 -0.3556***	 -0.2573**		 (0.0735)	 (0.0951)	 (0.0825)	 (0.0954)				Positive	frame	 -0.1360	 -0.0525	 -0.0984	 -0.1229		 (0.0698)	 (0.0915)	 (0.0781)	 (0.0915)	Anti-welfare	 	 -0.6247***	 	 		 	 (0.1015)	 	 	Negative	frame	X	Anti-welfare	 	 -0.4889**	 	 		 	 (0.1503)	 	 	Positive	frame	X	Anti-welfare	 	 -0.2005	 	 		 	 (0.1433)	 	 	Anti-immigrant	 	 	 -0.5612***	 		 	 	 (0.1187)	 	Negative	frame	X	Anti-immigrant	 	 	 -0.0541	 		 	 	 (0.1831)	 	Positive	frame	X	Anti-immigrant	 	 	 -0.1837	 		 	 	 (0.1757)	 	Economic	insecurity	 	 	 	 0.1803		 	 	 	 (0.0996)	Negative	frame	X	Economic	insecurity	 	 	 	 -0.2863		 	 	 	 (0.1492)	Positive	frame	X	Economic	insecurity	 	 	 	 -0.0246		 	 	 	 (0.1413)	cut1	 	 	 	 	Constant	 -0.5964***	 -0.9086***	 -0.7312***	 -0.5237***		 (0.0519)	 (0.0679)	 (0.0590)	 (0.0669)	cut2	 	 	 	 	Constant	 0.7173***	 0.4628***	 0.6042***	 0.7917***		 (0.0522)	 (0.0669)	 (0.0585)	 (0.0675)	
N	 4158	 4158	 4158	 4158	AIC	 2.176	 2.124	 2.156	 2.176	BIC	 -25575.8	 -25773.7	 -25637.2	 -25557.5	Ordered	logit	regressions,	coefficients	are	log	odds	with	standard	errors	in	parentheses.		*	p<0.05,	**	p<0.01,	***	p<0.001	
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Table	2:	Immigration	Framing	and	Support	for	Redistribution	in	Sweden		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)		 b/se	 b/se	 b/se	 b/se	No	frame	(ref.)	 	 	 	 				Negative	frame	 -0.6128***	 -0.5038***	 -0.5025***	 -0.5618***		 (0.1128)	 (0.1432)	 (0.1318)	 (0.1437)				Positive	frame	 -0.2173*	 -0.1873	 -0.0424	 -0.1020		 (0.1053)	 (0.1322)	 (0.1265)	 (0.1299)	Anti-welfare	 	 -1.3987***	 	 		 	 (0.1669)	 	 	Negative	frame	X	Anti-welfare	 	 -0.6012*	 	 		 	 (0.2665)	 	 	Positive	frame	X	Anti-welfare	 	 -0.4034	 	 		 	 (0.2422)	 	 	Anti-immigrant	 	 	 -0.5933***	 		 	 	 (0.1668)	 	Negative	frame	X	Anti-immigrant	 	 	 -0.5907*	 		 	 	 (0.2786)	 	Positive	frame	X	Anti-immigrant	 	 	 -0.5942*	 		 	 	 (0.2370)	 	Economic	insecurity	 	 	 	 0.1342		 	 	 	 (0.1568)	Negative	frame	X	Economic	insecurity	 	 	 	 -0.1344		 	 	 	 (0.2306)	Positive	frame	X	Economic	insecurity	 	 	 	 -0.3095		 	 	 	 (0.2217)	cut1	 	 	 	 	Constant	 -0.5027***	 -1.0873***	 -0.6833***	 -0.4520***		 (0.0793)	 (0.1065)	 (0.0964)	 (0.0984)	cut2	 	 	 	 	Constant	 0.7779***	 0.3685***	 0.6497***	 0.8297***		 (0.0810)	 (0.1017)	 (0.0960)	 (0.1005)	
N	 2001	 2001	 2001	 2001	AIC	 2.161	 1.991	 2.109	 2.163	BIC	 -10863.6	 -11186.8	 -10951.9	 -10843.1	Ordered	logit	regressions,	coefficients	are	log	odds	with	standard	errors	in	parentheses.		*	p<0.05,	**	p<0.01,	***	p<0.001	
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Table	3:	Immigration	Framing	and	Support	for	Redistribution	in	the	UK		 (9)	 (10)	 (11)	 (12)		 b/se	 b/se	 b/se	 b/se	No	frame	(ref.)	 	 	 	 				Negative	frame	 -0.6335***	 -0.4679***	 -0.4792***	 -0.4167***		 (0.0899)	 (0.1191)	 (0.1120)	 (0.1178)				Positive	frame	 -0.1417	 -0.1737	 -0.1637	 -0.1210		 (0.0866)	 (0.1171)	 (0.1114)	 (0.1178)	Anti-welfare	 	 -1.1057***	 	 		 	 (0.1325)	 	 	Negative	frame	X	Anti-welfare	 	 -0.5540**	 	 		 	 (0.1922)	 	 	Positive	frame	X	Anti-welfare	 	 -0.0664	 	 		 	 (0.1837)	 	 	Anti-immigrant	 	 	 -0.7993***	 		 	 	 (0.1329)	 	Negative	frame	X	Anti-immigrant	 	 	 -0.6360**	 		 	 	 (0.1989)	 	Positive	frame	X	Anti-immigrant	 	 	 0.0688	 		 	 	 (0.1833)	 	Economic	insecurity	 	 	 	 0.5522***		 	 	 	 (0.1266)	Negative	frame	X	Economic	insecurity	 	 	 	 -0.5183**		 	 	 	 (0.1821)	Positive	frame	X	Economic	insecurity	 	 	 	 -0.1148		 	 	 	 (0.1746)	cut1	 	 	 	 	Constant	 -0.9426***	 -1.4852***	 -1.2653***	 -0.7150***		 (0.0670)	 (0.0918)	 (0.0850)	 (0.0853)	cut2	 	 	 	 	Constant	 0.0850	 -0.3505***	 -0.1800*	 0.3225***		 (0.0638)	 (0.0857)	 (0.0801)	 (0.0837)	
N	 3269	 3269	 3269	 3269	AIC	 2.102	 1.990	 2.039	 2.092	BIC	 -19557.2	 -19906.7	 -19744.6	 -19570.7	Ordered	logit	regressions,	coefficients	are	log	odds	with	standard	errors	in	parentheses.		*	p<0.05,	**	p<0.01,	***	p<0.001 
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The	main	models	(models	1,	5,	and	9)	show	that	negative	framing	of	immigration	is	associated	with	reduced	support	for	greater	welfare	spending	in	all	countries.	Figure	2	depicts	the	predicted	probabilities	of	supporting	or	opposing	greater	spending	for	the	different	groups.	The	differences	between	the	negative	frame	and	the	control	group	are	stark	in	each	country.	In	Germany,	individuals	in	the	negative	treatment	group	have	a	44	percent	probability	of	opposing	increased	spending,	compared	to	36	percent	in	the	control	group.	The	differences	are	even	greater	in	Sweden	(53	vs.	38	percent)	and	the	UK	(42	vs.	28	percent).	These	results	provide	strong	support	for	H2(a).	Individuals	that	received	the	negative	framing	concerning	the	impact	of	immigration	on	the	welfare	state	are	much	less	likely	to	support	greater	spending	than	respondents	that	received	no	framing.	This	figure	also	suggests	some	cross-country	differences	in	the	level	of	support	for	greater	spending	within	the	negative	frame	group.	In	line	with	the	reasoning	about	the	impact	of	welfare	regimes	outlined	in	the	introduction,	Sweden	leads	the	way	with	over	half	of	respondents	in	this	group	unwilling	to	support	greater	spending.			 The	results	also	provide	some	support	for	H2(b).	Drawing	on	the	literature	on	negativity	bias,	we	expected	that	positive	framing	of	the	impact	of	immigration	would	be	weaker	than	negative	framing.	This	is	because	negative	information	tends	to	be	more	salient	and	memorable	than	positive	information	(Ledgerwood	&	Boydstun,	2014;	Boydstun	et	al,	2017;	Sparks	&	Ledgerwood,	2017).	Given	the	salience	of	immigration	as	an	issue	in	contemporary	politics,	we	also	expected	that	respondents	would	already	have	encountered	some	negative	messages	concerning	the	impact	of	immigration.	As	negative	messages	tend	to	be	stickier,	overturning	them	with	positive	information	can	be	challenging.			
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	Figure	2:	Predicted	probability	of	opposition	or	support	for	increased	welfare	spending	by	treatment	group.		 Figure	2	shows	that,	as	expected,	the	positive	frame	is	weaker	than	the	negative	frame	in	all	countries.13	In	addition,	individuals	in	the	positive	treatment	group	are	less	likely	to	support	increased	welfare	spending	and	more	likely	to	oppose	it	than	respondents	in	the	control	group.	However,	it	is	important	to	note	that	this	difference	in	support	for	increased	spending	between	the	positive	treatment	group	and	the	control	group	is																																																														13	We	refer	to	the	results	in	terms	of	predicted	probabilities	in	this	paper.	Marginal	effects	for	the	negative	and	positive	treatment	groups	are	available	in	the	online	appendix	in	Figures	A1	to	A4.	
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statistically	significant	only	in	Sweden	(see	tables	1-3).	That	positive	information	about	the	impact	of	immigration	can	reduce	support	for	welfare	spending	may	seem	anomalous.	However,	cultural	and	economic	factors	(Hainmueller	and	Hiscox	2007;	Hainmueller	and	Hopkins	2015;	Sides	and	Citrin	2007)	as	well	as	prior	media	coverage	of	immigration	are	likely	to	play	a	role	in	shaping	how	individuals	perceive	the	impact	of	migrants.	Previous	research	has	shown	that	immigration	is	usually	presented	in	an	overtly	negative	way	in	the	media	which	can	lead	to	individuals	developing	negative	priors	about	migrants	(Abrajano	et	al,	2017;	Alesina	et	al	2018;	Allen	&	Blinder,	2013).	As	these	negative	messages	tend	to	be	more	powerful	due	to	negativity	bias,	it	is	conceivable	that	even	the	use	of	the	term	‘immigrants’	in	a	positive	context	may	trigger	a	negative	response	among	respondents.	Further	support	for	this	proposition	can	be	found	in	studies	of	the	electoral	performance	of	anti-immigrant	political	parties.	They	show	that	simple	exposure	to	media	coverage	of	immigration-related	stories	–	whether	positive	or	negative	in	context	–	increases	support	for	anti-immigration	parties	(Boomgaarden	and	Vliegenthart,	2007;	Burscher	et	al,	2015).			Although	this	is	a	plausible	explanation,	it	is	possible	that	the	negative	effect	of	the	positive	treatment	is	a	methodological	artifact	in	the	sense	that	the	positive	frame	may	not	have	been	perceived	as	such.	The	pairwise	contrasts	of	the	treatment	coefficients	(Table	A2	in	the	online	appendix)	suggest	that	this	is	not	the	case	and	confirm	that	the	effects	of	the	negative	and	positive	treatments	are	distinct	from	each	other	in	all	cases.				 Two	further	tests	were	used	to	examine	if	the	positive	frame	may	not	be	perceived	as	positive.	The	first	was	a	pre-test	survey	using	a	convenience	sample	of	students	undertaken	at	[University	name	redacted	for	review].	69	percent	of	those	who	received	the	negative	frame	believed	that	it	was	accurate,	compared	to	66	percent	of	those	who	received	the	positive	frame.	Since	students	generally	display	more	pro-immigrant	attitudes,	we	would	expect	the	difference	in	the	perceptions	of	the	accuracy	of	these	frames	to	be	even	more	evident	in	the	broader	population.	But	since	our	sample	in	this	pre-test	was	small	(79	students),	we	have	also	undertaken	a	post-experiment	manipulation	check	in	the	UK	to	
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verify	if	the	positive	treatment	was	perceived	as	such.14	Respondents	in	each	treatment	group	were	subjected	to	the	same	experimental	protocol	as	set	out	above.	An	additional	question	was	added	at	the	end	of	the	experiment,	asking	whether	respondents	believe	that	immigrants	contribute	more	in	taxes	than	they	receive	from	the	welfare	state.	The	results	of	the	manipulation	check	can	be	found	in	Table	4.	They	show	clear	differences	between	the	positive	and	negative	treatment	groups.	42.3	percent	of	respondents	who	received	the	negative	frame	stated	that	they	believe	immigrants	contribute	more	than	they	cost	compared	to	53.7	percent	of	those	in	the	positive	frame	group.	A	formal	test	of	these	differences	can	be	found	in	Table	A3	of	the	online	appendix.	The	results	of	this	logit	model	show	that	respondents	in	the	negative	frame	group	are	significantly	less	likely	to	believe	that	immigrants	contribute	more	than	they	cost	than	those	in	the	positive	frame	group.	These	results	lead	us	to	conclude	that	both	the	negative	and	positive	frames	were	both	correctly	perceived	by	respondents.		
		Overall,	we	find	support	for	each	of	our	hypotheses.	Negative	frames	are	more	powerful	than	positive	frames	(H1).	The	results	also	show	that	negative	framing	of	the	impact	of	immigration	reduces	support	for	increased	welfare	spending	(H2(a)),	but	positive	framing	has	little	effect	(H2(b)).	In	the	next	section	we	consider	the	conditional	impact	of	our	treatments.		
																																																													14	Lack	of	funding	prevented	us	from	doing	the	same	checks	in	Germany	and	Sweden.	
Table	4.	Manipulation	check	frequencies	(%)			 Negative	frame	 Positive	frame	 No	frame	No	 57.73	 46.28	 54.15	Yes	 42.27	 53.72	 45.85	
N	 440	 430	 434	Note:	Respondents	were	asked	the	following	question:	“Do	you	believe	that,	on	average,	immigrants	contribute	more	in	taxes	and	national	insurance	than	they	receive	in	benefits	and	services	from	the	welfare	state?”	No,	immigrants	cost	more	than	they	contribute	Yes,	immigrants	contribute	more	than	they	cost	Fieldwork	carried	out	by	YouGov,	February	20th-21st	2019.	
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4.2	The	conditional	effect	of	negative	framing		While	the	results	presented	above	provide	strong	support	for	our	theoretical	argument,	it	is	possible	that	the	effect	of	negative	framing	could	be	stronger	for	individuals	that	hold	specific	beliefs	about	welfare	and	immigration.	The	first	conditional	effect	we	consider	is	whether	individuals	hold	anti-welfare	attitudes.15	Some	people	believe	that	welfare	benefits	are	intrinsically	wrong	and	that	many	benefit	claimants	are	undeserving.	It	is	likely	that	these	individuals	will	be	more	susceptible	to	negative	framing	as	it	will	reinforce	their	belief	that	many	people	unjustly	claim	benefits.	We	therefore	interacted	our	treatment	group	variable	with	the	binary	indicator	of	anti-welfare	attitudes.16			 The	results	can	be	found	in	models	2,	6,	and	10	of	Tables	1-3.	The	interaction	terms	in	these	models	are	all	negative	and	statistically	significant	for	the	respondents	that	received	the	negative	frame.	This	supports	our	argument	that	negative	frames	will	be	more	powerful.	As	the	results	from	the	positive	frame	group	are	not	significantly	different	from	those	of	the	control	group,	and	in	order	to	enhance	the	clarity	of	the	graphs,	Figures	3,	4,	and	5	contain	only	the	results	for	the	negative	frame	group	and	the	control	group.	To	further	ensure	that	the	graphs	are	readable,	we	only	plot	the	predicted	probabilities	for	opposition	to	welfare	spending.			Figure	3	shows	the	predicted	probabilities	of	opposing	increased	welfare	spending	depending	on	an	individual’s	pre-existing	welfare	attitudes.	In	comparison	to	the	control	group,	respondents	exposed	to	the	negative	frame	always	have	a	higher	probability	of	opposing	increased	welfare	spending.	However,	as	Figure	3	suggests,	this	difference	in	probability	between	the	treatment	and	control	group	is	much	more	pronounced	for	
																																																													15	We	choose	to	consider	the	different	interactions	in	separate	models	to	simplify	the	interpretation	of	the	results.	The	results	presented	in	this	section	are	not	appreciably	different	in	models	that	combine	all	the	interactions.	16	This	scale	from	the	original	question	has	been	recoded	into	a	binary	variable.	Responses	“Strongly	agree”	and	“Agree”	are	coded	1;	all	other	responses	are	coded	0.	The	results	using	the	original	scale	are	not	substantively	different	to	those	presented	in	this	paper.	A	graph	of	the	results	can	be	found	in	Figure	A8	of	the	online	appendix.	
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respondents	holding	anti-welfare	attitudes.	The	likelihood	of	opposing	welfare	spending	for	this	group	is	also	always	substantially	higher	than	for	respondents	who	do	not	hold	anti-welfare	attitudes.		For	example,	in	Germany	individuals	who	received	the	negative	frame	and	hold	anti-welfare	attitudes	have	a	59	percent	probability	opposing	increased	welfare	spending,	compared	to	32	percent	for	those	who	hold	no	such	attitudes.				
	Figure	3:	Predicted	probability	of	opposition	to	increased	welfare	spending	in	the	negative	treatment	group	conditional	on	pro/anti-welfare	attitudes		
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	It	is	also	likely	that	people	who	hold	negative	predispositions	towards	immigrants	will	be	more	receptive	to	negative	framing	regarding	the	impact	of	immigration.	To	examine	this,	we	interacted	a	dummy	capturing	anti-immigrant	attitudes	with	our	treatment	group	indicator.17	Figure	4	shows	that	the	probability	that	an	individual	in	the	negative	treatment	group	will	oppose	higher	welfare	spending	increases	substantially	for	those	harboring	anti-immigrant	attitudes.	However,	as	models	3,	7,	and	11	in	the	tables	show,	this	interaction	is	significant	in	Sweden	and	the	UK,	but	not	in	Germany.	This	indicates	that	in	Sweden	and	the	UK	the	effect	of	the	negative	treatment	is	further	amplified	for	respondents	who	hold	anti-immigrant	views.	In	all	three	countries,	opposition	to	welfare	spending	is	higher	among	those	that	hold	anti-immigrant	views	regardless	of	whether	they	were	in	the	negative	frame	or	control	group.	In	each	country,	individuals	who	received	the	negative	frame	were	more	likely	to	oppose	increased	spending	if	they	also	held	pro-immigrant	views.	These	results	indicate	that	negative	framing	increases	opposition	to	social	spending	among	both	pro-	and	anti-immigration	individuals	though	the	size	of	the	effect	is	greater	among	those	that	hold	anti-immigrant	attitudes	in	Sweden	and	the	UK.	Figure	A3	in	the	online	appendix	provides	further	evidence	of	this	result,	showing	the	marginal	effect	of	negative	framing	conditional	on	an	individual’s	pre-existing	attitudes	towards	immigrants.					
																																																													17	This	dummy	captures	the	average	response	to	the	two	questions	gauging	anti-immigrant	attitudes	(see	footnote	6).	Only	respondents	scoring	more	than	5	on	this	scale	are	considered	to	hold	anti-immigrant	attitudes.	The	results	using	the	original	scale	are	not	substantively	different	to	those	presented	in	this	paper.	A	graph	of	the	results	can	be	found	in	Figure	A9	of	the	online	appendix.	
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	Figure	4:	Predicted	probability	of	opposition	to	increased	welfare	spending	in	the	negative	treatment	group	conditional	on	attitudes	towards	immigrants		 	Finally,	if	individuals	are	currently	facing	or	expecting	economic	insecurity	in	the	future,	they	may	view	immigrants	as	competition	for	welfare	resources.	Economically	insecure	respondents	thus	may	be	more	susceptible	to	the	negative	frame.	The	results	of	
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the	interaction	between	the	dummy	capturing	economic	insecurity	and	the	treatment	variable	can	be	found	in	models	4,	8	and	12	of	the	tables	and	are	illustrated	in	Figure	5.18			
	Figure	5:	Predicted	probability	of	opposition	to	increased	welfare	spending	in	the	negative	treatment	group	conditional	on	perceived	economic	insecurity																																																															18	Those	who	stated	that	they	are	not	confident	about	keeping	their	current	job	or	are	not	employed	are	more	likely	to	perceive	immigrants	as	competition	and	were	coded	1,	and	those	who	said	they	were	either	very	confident,	confident,	or	slightly	confident	were	coded	0.	See	footnote	7	for	the	exact	question	wording.	The	results	using	the	original	scale	are	not	substantively	different	to	those	presented	in	this	paper.	A	graph	of	the	results	can	be	found	in	Figure	A10	of	the	online	appendix.	
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	In	Germany	and	Sweden,	the	interaction	is	not	statistically	significant	for	any	of	the	treatment	groups.	In	contrast,	Figure	5	shows	that	in	the	UK,	among	individuals	who	did	not	receive	any	frame,	those	who	perceive	themselves	as	economically	insecure	are	less	likely	to	oppose	increased	welfare	spending.19	However,	for	those	in	the	negative	frame	group,	perceived	economic	insecurity	does	not	affect	their	opposition	to	welfare	spending.	In	effect,	the	negative	framing	overrides	perceptions	of	economic	insecurity.	The	differences	between	the	UK	on	one	hand,	and	Germany	and	Sweden	on	the	other,	are	likely	a	result	of	the	current	welfare	generosity	and	the	type	of	immigration	experienced	in	each	country.	Germany	and	Sweden	have	more	generous	welfare	states	than	the	UK,	which	may	increase	the	perception	of	greater	competition	for	resources	in	the	latter.	Furthermore,	in	2016	Germany	introduced	stricter	rules	on	the	rights	of	EU	migrants	to	access	most	welfare	benefits	including	requiring	that	an	individual	has	lived	in	Germany	for	five	years	before	they	can	make	a	claim.	Restrictions	on	migrants’	access	to	the	welfare	state	is	likely	to	have	reduced	the	perception	that	they	represent	competition	to	the	native	population.	The	nature	of	immigration	could	also	change	perceptions	of	welfare	competition	in	each	country.	The	immigration	debate	in	the	UK	focuses	on	economic	migrants,	mainly	from	EU	countries,	and	the	impact	that	they	have	on	the	labor	market	and	welfare	services	including	benefits	and	housing.	In	Germany	and	Sweden,	recent	immigration	debates	have	revolved	around	refugees	from	Syria	and	Afghanistan.	These	debates	have	tended	to	emphasize	the	cultural	impact	of	immigration	rather	than	the	effect	on	the	labor	market.	However,	it	is	also	important	to	note	that	the	economically	secure	individuals	in	the	negative	frame	group	were	also	more	likely	to	oppose	increased	welfare	spending	than	economically	secure	respondents	in	the	control	group.	Further	confirmation	of	this	can	be	found	in	Figure	A4	which	shows	the	marginal	effect	of	negative	framing	conditional	on	an	individual’s	relative	economic	security.	This	suggests	that	although	economic	insecurity	amplifies	the	effect	of	the	negative	framing	of	immigration,	even	those	who	do	not	face	economic	insecurity	are	not	immune	to	it.			
																																																													19	This	is	particularly	the	case	for	the	unemployed,	as	indicated	in	figure	A10.	
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Taken	together,	these	results	indicate	that	the	effect	of	negative	framing	can	be	exacerbated	by	other	attitudes.	Individuals	that	believe	welfare	claimants	are	likely	to	be	undeserving,	and	those	that	hold	negative	predispositions	towards	immigrants	are	more	likely	to	oppose	increased	welfare	spending	if	they	received	the	negative	frame	in	our	experiment.	However,	in	most	instances,	negative	framing	increases	opposition	to	welfare	spending	irrespective	of	an	individual’s	pre-existing	attitudes	and	perceptions	of	economic	insecurity.	The	results	are	also	consistent	with	our	theoretical	argument:	the	effect	of	the	negative	frame	of	immigration	on	the	welfare	state	is	greater	in	these	conditional	models	than	the	effect	of	the	positive	frame.20		Overall,	the	results	show	that	negativity	bias	can	be	a	powerful	influence	on	individual	level	attitudes.		
5.	Conclusion		The	impact	of	immigration	on	politics	and	society	is	one	of	the	most	salient	issues	in	affluent	democracies.	The	increased	prominence	of	radical	right	parties,	and	the	shifts	on	immigration	policy	that	they	have	seemingly	enforced	on	mainstream	parties,	has	only	served	to	increase	the	importance	of	the	issue	(Abou-Chadi	&	Krause,	2018).	One	of	the	central	debates	surrounding	immigration	is	the	impact	that	it	has	on	government	finances,	principally	via	increased	pressure	on	the	welfare	state.	There	is	no	consistent	evidence	regarding	the	impact	of	immigration	on	the	welfare	state,	but	the	perception	that	immigrants	are	a	strain	on	the	welfare	state	remains,	particularly	among	opponents	of	immigration.			 In	this	research,	we	have	tested	whether	the	way	that	the	impact	of	immigration	is	framed	can	influence	individual	level	support	for	welfare	spending.	Using	a	survey	experiment,	we	randomly	assigned	individuals	in	Germany,	Sweden,	and	the	UK	to	receive	either	negative	information	regarding	the	impact	of	immigration,	positive	information,	or	no	information.	The	results	show	that	while	the	differences	in	the	level	of	welfare	
																																																													20	This	can	be	observed	in	Figures	A5-A7	of	the	online	appendix	which	provide	corresponding	predicted	probability	plots	for	the	positive	frame	group.	
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support/opposition	may	be	regime-related,	the	negative	framing	significantly	reduced	support	for,	and	increased	opposition	to,	greater	welfare	spending	in	all	three	countries.	Furthermore,	pre-existing	anti-welfare	and	anti-immigrant	attitudes	amplify	the	effects	of	negative	framing	of	immigration.	However,	the	positive	treatment	did	not	increase	support	for	welfare	spending	in	our	experiment.		We	argue	that	the	greater	power	of	the	negative	treatment	can	be	explained	by	negativity	bias.	Previous	research	shows	that	individuals	appear	to	be	predisposed	to	give	greater	weight	to	negative	information	(Baumeister	et	al.	2001;	Rozin	and	Royzman,	2001).	Moreover,	negative	information	is	usually	stronger	and	more	memorable	than	positive	information	(Ledgerwood	&	Boydstun,	2014;	Boydstun	et	al,	2017;	Sparks	&	Ledgerwood,	2017).	This	means	that	it	is	both	more	difficult	to	overturn	negative	preconceptions	and	easier	to	override	previously-held	positive	beliefs.			While	the	results	support	our	central	argument	that	negative	framing	of	immigration	reduces	support	for	welfare	spending,	it	should	be	noted	that	we	do	not	know	if	this	effect	persists	over	time.	Resource	limitations	prevented	the	use	of	a	re-contact	study.	However,	given	that	negative	frames	are	likely	to	be	stickier	and	more	memorable	than	positive	frames,	there	is	reason	to	believe	that	the	effects	may	not	be	transient.		Another	concern	is	that	the	findings	generated	by	our	survey	experiment	may	not	reflect	perfectly	the	real	world,	an	issue	emphasized	by	Barabas	and	Jerrit	(2010).	Our	respondents	were	not	made	aware	of	the	exact	source	of	information	they	were	presented	with.	In	the	real	world,	the	source	of	such	information	is	often	evident	and	it	may	affect	its	credibility.	Using	actual	newspaper	articles	or	TV	reports,	rather	than	general	framing,	would	have	addressed	this	concern.	However,	directly	comparable	information	was	not	readily	available.	While	various	articles	and	reports	have	emphasized	either	the	costs	or	benefits	of	immigration,	their	measures	of	costs/benefits	are	rarely	comparable.21	Since	
																																																													21	Some	assessments	are	based	on	absolute	contribution/cost	of	immigrants,	while	others	focus	on	their	relative	contribution	vis	a	vis	the	natives.	Some	sources	reflect	figures	for	the	whole	
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our	argument	is	that	negative	frames	carry	more	weight	than	positive	frames,	it	was	imperative	that	the	information	about	immigration	provided	to	the	two	treatment	groups	was	identical	in	everything	apart	from	the	direction.	Consequently,	we	cannot	exclude	the	possibility	that	the	effects	we	found	would	be	somewhat	smaller	in	the	natural	setting,	but	we	have	no	reason	to	believe	that	the	direction	of	the	effect	would	be	very	different.			These	results	have	potentially	significant	implications	for	those	engaged	in	debates	about	immigration.	It	is	often	believed	that	engaging	with	the	evidence	and	presenting	the	generally	positive	economic	impact	of	immigration	will	change	public	opinion.	However,	the	tone	of	the	immigration	debate	is	overwhelmingly	negative	in	most	European	countries.	As	individuals	are	innately	predisposed	to	negative	information	and	afford	it	greater	weight,	such	positive	accounts	regarding	the	impact	of	immigration	are	easier	to	discount.	This	presents	a	formidable	challenge	to	those	on	the	pro-immigration	side	of	the	argument.	A	further	implication	of	this	research	is	that	support	for	the	welfare	state	may	be	more	difficult	to	sustain	if	opponents	consistently	link	together	social	spending	and	immigration.	If	these	beliefs	become	more	widely	held,	overturning	negative	preconceptions	about	the	nature	of	social	expenditure	will	become	increasingly	difficult	which	may	present	a	threat	to	the	sustainability	of	the	welfare	state.			
																																																													immigrant	population,	while	others	for	the	average	immigrant.	Assumptions	underpinning	calculations	are	also	often	different.	
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APPENDIX		
	
Marginal	effects	graphs	
		
		Figure	A1.	The	marginal	effect	of	negative	and	positive	frames	on	the	probability	of	opposition	and	support	for	welfare	spending			
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	Figure	A2.	The	marginal	effect	of	negative	and	positive	frames	on	the	probability	of	opposition	to	welfare	spending	conditional	on	anti/pro-welfare	attitudes				
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	Figure	A3.	The	marginal	effect	of	negative	and	positive	frames	on	the	probability	of	opposition	to	welfare	spending	conditional	on	anti/pro-immigrant	attitudes	
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	Figure	A4.	The	marginal	effect	of	negative	and	positive	frames	on	the	probability	of	opposition	to	welfare	spending	conditional	on	perceptions	of	economic	insecurity			 	
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	Figure	A5:	Predicted	probability	of	opposition	to	increased	welfare	spending	in	the	positive	treatment	group	conditional	on	pro/anti-welfare	attitudes		 	
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	Figure	A6:	Predicted	probability	of	opposition	to	increased	welfare	spending	in	the	positive	treatment	group	conditional	on	attitudes	towards	immigrants		 	
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	Figure	A7:	Predicted	probability	of	opposition	to	increased	welfare	spending	in	the	positive	treatment	group	conditional	on	perceived	economic	insecurity			 	
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	Figure	A8:	Predicted	probability	of	opposition	to	increased	welfare	spending	in	the	positive	treatment	group	conditional	on	pro/anti-welfare	attitudes		Note:	Question	“To	what	extent	you	agree	or	disagree	with	the	following	statement: Many	people	who	receive	welfare	benefits	don’t	really	deserve	any	help.”	1.	Strongly	agree,	2.	Tend	to	agree,	3.	Neither	agree	nor	disagree,	4.	Tend	to	disagree,	5.	Strongly	disagree		 	
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	Figure	A9:	Predicted	probability	of	opposition	to	increased	welfare	spending	in	the	positive	treatment	group	conditional	on	attitudes	towards	immigrants		Note:	Questions:	“On	a	scale	from	0	to	10,	where	0	stands	for	“would	not	mind	at	all”	and	10	stands	for	“would	mind	a	great	deal”,	please	say	how	much	would	you	mind	or	not	mind:	(a)	living	next	door	to	an	immigrant	family?,	(b)	working	with	immigrants?”	An	index	was	created	by	averaging	responses	on	the	two	scales.		 	
44 
	Figure	A10:	Predicted	probability	of	opposition	to	increased	welfare	spending	in	the	positive	treatment	group	conditional	on	perceived	economic	insecurity		Note:	Question:	“Looking	forward	to	the	next	12	months,	how	confident	do	you	feel	about	being	able	to	keep	your	current	job?”	1.	Very	confident,	2.	Confident,	3.	Slightly	confident,	4.	Not	confident,	5.	Not	employed	at	the	moment		 	
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Table	A1:	Immigration	Framing	and	Welfare	Support	(with	controls)		 Germany	 	 Sweden	 	 UK		 b/se	 	 b/se	 	 b/se	No	frame	(ref)	 	 	 	 	 	Negative	frame	 -0.3505***	 	 -0.7367***	 	 -0.7843***		 (0.0748)	 	 (0.1244)	 	 (0.0985)	Positive	frame	 -0.1183	 	 -0.2752*	 	 -0.1407		 (0.0708)	 	 (0.1167)	 	 (0.0936)	Age	(18-24	ref)	 0.0000	 Age	 0.0065	 Age	 0.0117**	25-34	 -0.1401	 	 (0.0043)	 	 (0.0038)		 (0.1421)	 Male	 -0.1275	 Female	 -0.1369	35-44	 -0.1813	 	 (0.1028)	 	 (0.0810)	
	 (0.1499)	 Education	level	(elementary,	ref)	 	 Education	level	(no	qualifications,	ref)	 	45-54	 -0.2991*	 Secondary	 0.1572	 Vocational	 0.0880		 (0.1462)	 	 (0.2194)	 	 (0.1846)	Over	55	 -0.2237	 Post-secondary	 0.2564	 Secondary	 -0.0627		 (0.1396)	 	 (0.2723)	 	 (0.1672)	Female	 -0.3985***	 Post-secondary	vocational	 -0.0563	 Tertiary	 0.3113		 (0.0619)	 	 (0.2549)	 	 (0.1645)	Education	level	 	 University,	1-2y	 0.2131	 Don’t	know	 -0.4064	(no	qualification,	ref)	 	 	 (0.2486)	 	 (0.2680)	Still	in	training	 0.0860	 University,	3-4y	 0.4893*	 Work	status	(full	time,	ref)	 		 (0.2561)	 	 (0.2282)	 Part-time	8-29h	p/w	 0.2814*	Still	studying	 -0.0987	 University,	5y+	 0.1346	 	 (0.1194)		 (0.2078)	 	 (0.2458)	 Part-time	<	8h	p/w	 0.4485	Vocational	degree	 -0.1349	 Doctorate	 -0.4536	 	 (0.3016)		 (0.1423)	 	 (0.5417)	 Full	time	student	 0.9086***	University	or	higher	 0.0351	 Rather	not	say	 -0.1074	 	 (0.1972)		 (0.1509)	 	 (0.4880)	 retired	 0.4092**	Refused	to	say	 0.0022	 Work	status		 	 	 (0.1345)		 (0.1749)	 Full	time	 0.0264	 Unemployed	 0.5983*	Work	status	(full	time,	ref)	 	 	 (0.2624)	 	 (0.2369)		 	 Part	time	8-29h	p/w	 0.3075	 Not	working	 0.8413***	
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Part	time	8-29	h	p/w	 0.1894	 	 (0.2701)	 	 (0.1549)		 (0.1142)	 Part	time	<	8h	p/w	 0.6184*	 Past	vote	(Conservatives,	ref)	 	Part	time	<	8h	p/w	 -0.3821	 	 (0.2751)	 Labour	 1.8369***		 (0.3209)	 Studying	 0.1071	 	 (0.1017)	Not	working	 0.3472***	 	 (0.2446)	 Liberal	Democrats	 1.5865***		 (0.0710)	 Pensioner	 -0.2314	 	 (0.1595)	Other		 -0.2529	 	 (0.2803)	 SNP	 2.0325***		 (0.7361)	 Seeking	work	 -0.3868	 	 (0.2249)	Past	vote	(CDU/CSU,	ref)	 	 	 (0.3431)	 Plaid	Cymru	 0.3541	SPD	 0.4355***	 Does	not	work	at	all	 0.5178	 	 (0.5209)		 (0.0920)	 	 (0.4916)	 UKIP	 0.5165*	Die	Linke	 0.4515**	 Past	vote	(Moderates,	ref)	 	 	 (0.2550)		 (0.1390)	 	 	 Green	 1.8621***	Gruene	 0.8502***	 Centre	Party	 0.7763**	 	 (0.3361)		 (0.1309)	 	 (0.2978)	 Other	 0.3784	FDP	 -0.5826**	 Liberals	 0.4764	 	 (0.4014)		 (0.2009)	 	 (0.2531)	 Don’t	know	 0.2198	AfD	 -0.8889***	 Christian	Democrats	 0.6209*	 	 (0.4003)		 (0.1830)	 	 (0.2885)	 Not	asked	 0.7742***	Other	 -0.0547	 Greens	 2.0849***	 	 (0.1290)		 (0.1645)	 	 (0.2262)	 	 	Non-voter	 0.0486	 Social	Democrats	 1.9012***	 	 		 (0.0815)	 	 (0.1529)	 	 		 	 Left	Party	 2.8296***	 	 		 	 	 (0.2297)	 	 		 	 Feminist	Initiative	 3.1209***	 	 		 	 	 (0.3800)	 	 		 	 Sweden	Democrats	 -0.7365***	 	 		 	 	 (0.1808)	 	 		 	 Other	 1.6851**	 	 		 	 	 (0.6147)	 	 		 	 Non-voter	 0.6989*	 		 		 	 	 (0.2941)	 	 		 	 None	of	the	above	 0.5238	 	 	
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	 	 	 (0.3561)	 	 		 	 No	right	to	vote	 1.6036***	 	 		 	 	 (0.2834)	 	 		 	 Don’t	know	 1.2064***	 	 		 	 	 (0.3120)	 	 		 	 Don’t	want	to	say	 0.9988***	 	 		 	 	 (0.1776)	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	cut1	 -0.7685***	 	 0.8772*	 	 0.7682**		 (0.2005)	 	 (0.4221)	 	 (0.2727)		 	 	 	 	 	cut2	 0.5974**	 	 2.4750***	 	 1.9832***		 (0.2002)	 	 (0.4260)	 	 (0.2759)	
N	 4158	 	 2001	 	 3191	Log	likelihood	 -4417.446	 	 -1879.471	 	 -3043.3224	*	p<0.05,	**	p<0.01,	***	p<0.001	Note:	Differences	in	categories	are	due	to	different	questions	asked	(or	the	way	in	which	questions	are	coded)	in	the	YouGov	Omnibus	in	the	respective	countries.	The	vote	in	the	last	elections	is	taken	as	a	proxy	for	political	leaning.	The	results	are	unaffected	if	party	id	is	used	instead.		 	
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Table	A2.	Pairwise	contrasts	of	treatment	groups		 (i) Germany	Treatment	group	 Contrast	 Std.	error	 Sig.	 95%	conf	interval	Positive	vs	negative	 	 .2328031	 .0735468	 0.005	 .0567335					 .4088727	Control	vs	negative		 .3688177	 .0735311	 0.000	 		.1927857					 .5448496	Control	vs	positive	 .1360146	 .0697729	 0.154	 -.0310203					 	.3030495		 (ii) Sweden	Treatment	group	 Contrast	 Std.	error	 Sig.	 95%	conf	interval	Positive	vs	negative	 	 .3955124	 .1106948	 0.001	 .1305112					 .6605136	Control	vs	negative		 .6128006	 .1128207	 0.000	 		.3427101					 .8828912	Control	vs	positive	 .2172882	 .1052672	 0.117	 -.0347195					 	.4692959		 (iii) United	Kingdom	Treatment	group	 Contrast	 Std.	error	 Sig.	 95%	conf	interval	Positive	vs	negative		 .4918099	 .0881157	 0.000	 .2808626					 .7027572	Control	vs	negative		 .6335371	 .0899221	 0.000	 .4182655					 .8488087	Control	vs	positive	 .1417272	 .0866312	 0.306	 -.0656661	 		.3491205				 	
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Table	A3.	Manipulation	check	–	logit	results		 		 b/se	Positive	frame	(ref.)	 				Negative	frame	 -0.461**		 (0.148)				No	frame	 -0.293*		 (0.149)	Constant	 0.065		 (0.106)	N	 1304	Log-likelihood	 -885.978	*	p<0.05,	**	p<0.01,	***	p<0.001	Note:	dependent	variable	is	the	question:	“Do	you	believe	that,	on	average,	immigrants	contribute	more	in	taxes	and	national	insurance	than	they	receive	in	benefits	and	services	from	the	welfare	state?”.	Responses	are	coded:	0	“No,	immigrants	cost	more	than	they	contribute”	and	1	“Yes,	immigrants	contribute	more	than	they	cost”.	Fieldwork	carried	out	by	YouGov,	February	20th-21st	2019.		 	
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Table	A4:	Immigration	Framing	and	Support	for	Social	Spending	in	Germany	–	reduced	sample		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)		 b/se	 b/se	 b/se	 b/se	No	frame	(ref.)	 	 	 	 				Negative	frame	 -0.341**	 -0.079	 -0.285*	 -0.260		 (0.105)	 (0.136)	 (0.120)	 (0.137)				Positive	frame	 -0.148	 0.020	 -0.122	 -0.199		 (0.101)	 (0.132)	 (0.114)	 (0.131)	Anti-welfare	 	 -0.681***	 	 		 	 (0.145)	 	 	Negative	frame	X	Anti-welfare	 	 -0.638**	 	 		 	 (0.217)	 	 	Positive	frame	X	Anti-welfare	 	 -0.327	 	 		 	 (0.207)	 	 	Anti-immigrant	 	 	 -0.614***	 		 	 	 (0.160)	 	Negative	frame	X	Anti-immigrant	 	 	 -0.253	 		 	 	 (0.255)	 	Positive	frame	X	Anti-immigrant	 	 	 -0.131	 		 	 	 (0.247)	 	Economic	insecurity	 	 	 	 0.028		 	 	 	 (0.141)	Negative	frame	X	Economic	insecurity	 	 	 	 -0.213		 	 	 	 (0.213)	Positive	frame	X	Economic	insecurity	 	 	 	 0.139		 	 	 	 (0.205)		 	 	 	 	cut1	 -0.610***	 -0.960***	 -0.759***	 -0.599***		 (0.074)	 (0.096)	 (0.085)	 (0.095)	cut2	 0.667***	 0.396***	 0.546***	 0.679***		 (0.074)	 (0.094)	 (0.084)	 (0.095)	N	 2001	 2001	 2001	 2001	Log-likelihood	 -2178.452	 -2104.763	 -2150.872	 -2177.048	AIC	 4364.905	 4223.526	 4315.744	 4368.096	*	p<0.05,	**	p<0.01,	***	p<0.001	Note:	N	reduced	to	correspond	to	the	Swedish	sample.					 	
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Table	A5:	Immigration	Framing	and	Support	for	Social	Spending	in	United	Kingdom	–	reduced	sample		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)		 b/se	 b/se	 b/se	 b/se	No	frame	(ref.)	 	 	 	 				Negative	frame	 -0.628***	 -0.436**	 -0.375**	 -0.424**		 (0.114)	 (0.152)	 (0.140)	 (0.150)				Positive	frame	 -0.073	 -0.062	 -0.071	 -0.045		 (0.113)	 (0.153)	 (0.144)	 (0.152)	Anti-welfare	 	 -0.940***	 	 		 	 (0.169)	 	 	Negative	frame	X	Anti-welfare	 	 -0.621*	 	 		 	 (0.242)	 	 	Positive	frame	X	Anti-welfare	 	 -0.280	 	 		 	 (0.241)	 	 	Anti-immigrant	 	 	 -0.574***	 		 	 	 (0.171)	 	Negative	frame	X	Anti-immigrant	 	 	 -0.912***	 		 	 	 (0.255)	 	Positive	frame	X	Anti-immigrant	 	 	 -0.028	 		 	 	 (0.242)	 	Economic	insecurity	 	 	 	 0.574***		 	 	 	 (0.162)	Negative	frame	X	Economic	insecurity	 	 	 	 -0.506*		 	 	 	 (0.230)	Positive	frame	X	Economic	insecurity	 	 	 	 -0.148		 	 	 	 (0.229)		 	 	 	 	cut1	 -0.889***	 -1.369***	 -1.123***	 -0.660***		 (0.085)	 (0.119)	 (0.106)	 (0.108)	cut2	 0.106	 -0.281*	 -0.079	 0.346**		 (0.081)	 (0.111)	 (0.101)	 (0.107)	N	 2001	 2001	 2001	 2001	Log-likelihood	 -2083.588	 -1981.251	 -2026.437	 -2071.839	AIC	 4175.176	 3976.501	 4066.875	 4157.679	*	p<0.05,	**	p<0.01,	***	p<0.001	Note:		N	reduced	to	correspond	to	the	Swedish	sample.
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Table	A6:	Germany	-	treatment	group	balance		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)		 Age	 Gender	 Past	vote	 Education	 Work	status		 b/se	 b/se	 b/se	 b/se	 b/se	
Negative	frame	group	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	18-24	(ref.)	 	 	 	 	 	25-34	 -0.066	 	 	 	 		 (0.167)	 	 	 	 	35-44	 0.157	 	 	 	 		 (0.169)	 	 	 	 	45-54	 0.064	 	 	 	 		 (0.161)	 	 	 	 	Over	55	 0.126	 	 	 	 		 (0.146)	 	 	 	 	Female	 	 0.124	 	 	 		 	 (0.079)	 	 	 	CDU/CSU	(ref.)	 	 	 	 	 	SPD	 	 	 -0.257*	 	 		 	 	 (0.116)	 	 	Die	Linke	 	 	 -0.139	 	 		 	 	 (0.169)	 	 	Grüne	 	 	 -0.064	 	 		 	 	 (0.168)	 	 	FDP	 	 	 0.136	 	 		 	 	 (0.217)	 	 	AfD	 	 	 0.095	 	 		 	 	 (0.226)	 	 	Other	 	 	 -0.317	 	 		 	 	 (0.206)	 	 	Non-voter	 	 	 -0.235*	 	 		 	 	 (0.104)	 	 	No	qualifications	(ref.)	 	 	 	 	 	Still	training	 	 	 	 0.274	 		 	 	 	 (0.328)	 	Still	studying	 	 	 	 0.427	 		 	 	 	 (0.280)	 	Vocational	degree	 	 	 	 0.277	 		 	 	 	 (0.207)	 	University	or	higher	degree	 	 	 	 0.292	 		 	 	 	 (0.213)	 	Full-time	(ref.)	 	 	 	 	 	P/T	8-29	hours	p/w	 	 	 	 	 -0.096		 	 	 	 	 (0.146)	P/T	less	than	8	hours	p/w	 	 	 	 	 0.216		 	 	 	 	 (0.422)	Not	working	 	 	 	 	 -0.090		 	 	 	 	 (0.084)	Constant	 -0.113	 -0.099	 0.107	 -0.311	 0.017	
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	 (0.133)	 (0.057)	 (0.076)	 (0.200)	 (0.065)	
Positive	frame	group	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	18-24	(ref.)	 	 	 	 	 	25-34	 0.247	 	 	 	 		 (0.166)	 	 	 	 	35-44	 0.383*	 	 	 	 		 (0.170)	 	 	 	 	45-54	 0.089	 	 	 	 		 (0.164)	 	 	 	 	Over	55	 0.275	 	 	 	 		 (0.148)	 	 	 	 	Female	 	 0.060	 	 	 		 	 (0.078)	 	 	 	CDU/CSU	(ref.)	 	 	 	 	 	SPD	 	 	 -0.149	 	 		 	 	 (0.117)	 	 	Die	Linke	 	 	 -0.050	 	 		 	 	 (0.168)	 	 	Grüne	 	 	 -0.105	 	 		 	 	 (0.174)	 	 	FDP	 	 	 0.038	 	 		 	 	 (0.227)	 	 	AfD	 	 	 0.230	 	 		 	 	 (0.228)	 	 	Other	 	 	 0.036	 	 		 	 	 (0.193)	 	 	Non-voter	 	 	 -0.026	 	 		 	 	 (0.103)	 	 	No	qualifications	(ref.)	 	 	 	 	 	Still	training	 	 	 	 0.433	 		 	 	 	 (0.309)	 	Still	studying	 	 	 	 0.429	 		 	 	 	 (0.279)	 	Vocational	degree	 	 	 	 0.318	 		 	 	 	 (0.204)	 	University	or	higher	degree	 	 	 	 0.204	 		 	 	 	 (0.212)	 	Full-time	(ref.)	 	 	 	 	 	P/T	8-29	hours	p/w	 	 	 	 	 -0.113		 	 	 	 	 (0.146)	P/T	less	than	8	hours	p/w	 	 	 	 	 -0.218		 	 	 	 	 (0.445)	Not	working	 	 	 	 	 -0.051		 	 	 	 	 (0.084)	Constant	 -0.253	 -0.058	 0.006	 -0.312	 0.010		 (0.136)	 (0.055)	 (0.077)	 (0.198)	 (0.065)	N	 4158	 4158	 4158	 3661	 4147	Log-likelihood	 -4561.03	 -4566.16	 -4559.85	 -3992.07	 -4553.33	*	p<0.05,	**	p<0.01,	***	p<0.001	
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Table	A7:	SWE	-	treatment	group	balance		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)		 Age	 Gender	 Past	vote	 Education	 Work	status		 b/se	 b/se	 b/se	 b/se	 b/se	
Negative	frame	group	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	Age	 -0.002	 	 	 	 		 (0.004)	 	 	 	 	Male	 	 -0.173	 	 	 		 	 (0.117)	 	 	 	Moderates	(ref.)	 	 	 	 	 	Centre	Party	 	 	 -0.063	 	 		 	 	 (0.359)	 	 	Liberals		 	 	 -0.385	 	 		 	 	 (0.285)	 	 	Christian	Democrats	 	 	 -0.100	 	 		 	 	 (0.337)	 	 	Greens	 	 	 0.041	 	 		 	 	 (0.275)	 	 	Social	Democrats	 	 	 0.042	 	 		 	 	 (0.185)	 	 	Left	Party	 	 	 0.068	 	 		 	 	 (0.277)	 	 	Feminist	Initiative	 	 	 -0.007	 	 		 	 	 (0.352)	 	 	Sweden	Democrats	 	 	 0.146	 	 		 	 	 (0.187)	 	 	Other	 	 	 -0.076	 	 		 	 	 (0.490)	 	 	Non-voter	 	 	 -0.285	 	 		 	 	 (0.359)	 	 	None	of	the	above	 	 	 -0.121	 	 		 	 	 (0.469)	 	 	No	right	to	vote	 	 	 0.519	 	 		 	 	 (0.342)	 	 	Don’t	know	 	 	 -0.202	 	 		 	 	 (0.487)	 	 	Don’t	want	to	say	 	 	 0.163	 	 		 	 	 (0.254)	 	 	Elementary	school	(ref.)	 	 	 	 	 	Secondary	school	 	 	 	 0.099	 		 	 	 	 (0.239)	 	Post-secondary	 	 	 	 -0.304	 		 	 	 	 (0.316)	 	Post-secondary	vocational	 	 	 	 0.253	 		 	 	 	 (0.288)	 	University,	1-2	years	 	 	 	 -0.166	 		 	 	 	 (0.290)	 	University,	3-4	years	 	 	 	 -0.280	 		 	 	 	 (0.250)	 	
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University,	5	years	or	more	 	 	 	 -0.133	 		 	 	 	 (0.272)	 	Doctorate	 	 	 	 0.298	 		 	 	 	 (0.533)	 	Rather	not	say	 	 	 	 -0.140	 		 	 	 	 (0.661)	 	Working	full-time	 	 	 	 	 -0.029		 	 	 	 	 (0.326)	Working	part-time	(8-29	hours)	 	 	 	 	 -0.113		 	 	 	 	 (0.324)	Working	part-time	(less	than	8	hours)	 	 	 	 	 -0.616		 	 	 	 	 (0.342)	Student	 	 	 	 	 0.248		 	 	 	 	 (0.289)	Pensioner	 	 	 	 	 -0.080		 	 	 	 	 (0.330)	Seeking	work	 	 	 	 	 0.027		 	 	 	 	 (0.442)	Does	not	work	at	all	 	 	 	 	 -0.274		 	 	 	 	 (0.605)	Constant	 0.016	 0.016	 -0.093	 -0.017	 -0.012		 (0.181)	 (0.082)	 (0.136)	 (0.216)	 (0.323)	
Positive	frame	group	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	Age	 -0.003	 	 	 	 		 (0.004)	 	 	 	 	Male	 	 0.023	 	 	 		 	 (0.117)	 	 	 	Moderates	(ref.)	 	 	 	 	 	Centre	Party	 	 	 0.036	 	 		 	 	 (0.336)	 	 	Liberals		 	 	 -0.220	 	 		 	 	 (0.273)	 	 	Christian	Democrats	 	 	 -0.535	 	 		 	 	 (0.362)	 	 	Greens	 	 	 -0.046	 	 		 	 	 (0.269)	 	 	Social	Democrats	 	 	 -0.061	 	 		 	 	 (0.183)	 	 	Left	Party	 	 	 0.231	 	 		 	 	 (0.261)	 	 	Feminist	Initiative	 	 	 -0.586	 	 		 	 	 (0.393)	 	 	Sweden	Democrats	 	 	 -0.171	 	 		 	 	 (0.189)	 	 	Other	 	 	 0.054	 	 		 	 	 (0.680)	 	 	
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Non-voter	 	 	 0.014	 	 		 	 	 (0.334)	 	 	None	of	the	above	 	 	 0.291	 	 		 	 	 (0.415)	 	 	No	right	to	vote	 	 	 0.383	 	 		 	 	 (0.349)	 	 	Don’t	know	 	 	 -0.855	 	 		 	 	 (0.559)	 	 	Don’t	want	to	say	 	 	 -0.127	 	 		 	 	 (0.259)	 	 	Elementary	school	(ref.)	 	 	 	 	 	Secondary	school	 	 	 	 -0.039	 		 	 	 	 (0.242)	 	Post-secondary	 	 	 	 -0.244	 		 	 	 	 (0.313)	 	Post-secondary	vocational	 	 	 	 0.253	 		 	 	 	 (0.293)	 	University,	1-2	years	 	 	 	 0.041	 		 	 	 	 (0.287)	 	University,	3-4	years	 	 	 	 0.242	 		 	 	 	 (0.246)	 	University,	5	years	or	more	 	 	 	 0.138	 		 	 	 	 (0.269)	 	Doctorate	 	 	 	 -0.052	 		 	 	 	 (0.628)	 	Rather	not	say	 	 	 	 0.185	 		 	 	 	 (0.681)	 	Working	full-time		 	 	 	 	 -0.180		 	 	 	 	 (0.322)	Working	part-time	(8-29	hours)	 	 	 	 	 -0.274		 	 	 	 	 (0.316)	Working	part-time	(less	than	8	hours)	 	 	 	 	 -0.974**		 	 	 	 	 (0.321)	Student	 	 	 	 	 0.436		 	 	 	 	 (0.291)	Pensioner	 	 	 	 	 -0.094		 	 	 	 	 (0.331)	Seeking	work	 	 	 	 	 0.207		 	 	 	 	 (0.431)	Does	not	work	at	all	 	 	 	 	 -0.021		 	 	 	 	 (0.583)	Constant	 0.112	 -0.036	 0.036	 -0.100	 0.114		 (0.182)	 (0.083)	 (0.134)	 (0.216)	 (0.318)	N	 2001	 2001	 2001	 2001	 2001	Log-likelihood	 -2229.086	 -2227.605	 -2217.779	 -2215.945	 -2217.863	*	p<0.05,	**	p<0.01,	***	p<0.001		
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Table	A8:	UK	-	treatment	group	balance		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)		 Age	 Gender	 Past	vote	 Education	 Work	status		 b/se	 b/se	 b/se	 b/se	 b/se	
Negative	frame	group	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	Age	 0.000	 	 	 	 		 (0.003)	 	 	 	 	Female	 	 -0.063	 	 	 		 	 (0.095)	 	 	 	Conservative	(ref.)	 	 	 	 	 	Labour	 	 	 0.173	 	 		 	 	 (0.111)	 	 	Liberal	Democrat	 	 	 0.064	 	 		 	 	 (0.195)	 	 	Scottish	National	Party	(SNP)	 	 	 0.046	 	 		 	 	 (0.235)	 	 	Plaid	Cymru	 	 	 0.127	 	 		 	 	 (0.667)	 	 	UK	Independence	Party	(UKIP)	 	 	 -0.424	 	 		 	 	 (0.367)	 	 	Green	 	 	 -0.055	 	 		 	 	 (0.320)	 	 	Other	 	 	 0.330	 	 		 	 	 (0.390)	 	 	Don’t	know	 	 	 0.170	 	 		 	 	 (0.521)	 	 	Not	Asked	 	 	 0.120	 	 		 	 	 (0.170)	 	 	No	qualifications	(ref.)	 	 	 	 	 	Vocational	 	 	 	 -0.308	 		 	 	 	 (0.252)	 	Secondary	 	 	 	 -0.357	 		 	 	 	 (0.222)	 	Tertiary	 	 	 	 -0.244	 		 	 	 	 (0.214)	 	Don’t	know	 	 	 	 0.203	 		 	 	 	 (0.338)	 	Working	full-time	(ref.)	 	 	 	 	 	Working	part	time	(8-29	hours	a	week)	 	 	 	 	 -0.119		 	 	 	 	 (0.144)	Working	part	time	(Less	than	8	hours	a	week)	 	 	 	 	 0.152		 	 	 	 	 (0.387)	Full	time	student	 	 	 	 	 -0.192		 	 	 	 	 (0.214)	Retired	 	 	 	 	 -0.066	
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	 	 	 	 	 (0.120)	Unemployed	 	 	 	 	 0.409		 	 	 	 	 (0.316)	Not	working	 	 	 	 	 0.244		 	 	 	 	 (0.185)	Constant	 -0.024	 0.031	 -0.085	 0.254	 0.004		 (0.145)	 (0.070)	 (0.080)	 (0.204)	 (0.074)	
Positive	frame	group	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	Age	 0.001	 	 	 	 		 (0.003)	 	 	 	 	Female	 	 -0.105	 	 	 		 	 (0.095)	 	 	 	Conservative	(ref.)	 	 	 	 	 	Labour	 	 	 -0.011	 	 		 	 	 (0.111)	 	 	Liberal	Democrat	 	 	 -0.001	 	 		 	 	 (0.189)	 	 	Scottish	National	Party	(SNP)	 	 	 -0.444	 	 		 	 	 (0.264)	 	 	Plaid	Cymru	 	 	 -0.038	 	 		 	 	 (0.693)	 	 	UK	Independence	Party	(UKIP)	 	 	 -0.108	 	 		 	 	 (0.352)	 	 	Green	 	 	 -0.622	 	 		 	 	 (0.404)	 	 	Other	 	 	 0.074	 	 		 	 	 (0.428)	 	 	Don’t	know	 	 	 -0.221	 	 		 	 	 (0.524)	 	 	Not	Asked	 	 	 0.240	 	 		 	 	 (0.163)	 	 	No	qualifications	(ref.)	 	 	 	 	 	Vocational	 	 	 	 0.096	 		 	 	 	 (0.257)	 	Secondary	 	 	 	 -0.029	 		 	 	 	 (0.229)	 	Tertiary	 	 	 	 -0.186	 		 	 	 	 (0.224)	 	Don’t	know	 	 	 	 0.325	 		 	 	 	 (0.352)	 	Working	full-time	(ref.)	 	 	 	 	 	Working	part	time	(8-29	hours	a	week)	 	 	 	 	 -0.284		 	 	 	 	 (0.153)	Working	part	time	(Less	than	8	hours	a	week)	 	 	 	 	 0.349		 	 	 	 	 (0.406)	Full	time	student	 	 	 	 	 0.035	
59 
	 	 	 	 	 (0.208)	Retired	 	 	 	 	 0.041		 	 	 	 	 (0.119)	Unemployed	 	 	 	 	 0.534		 	 	 	 	 (0.296)	Not	working	 	 	 	 	 0.034		 	 	 	 	 (0.184)	Constant	 -0.060	 0.028	 -0.030	 0.045	 -0.027		 (0.147)	 (0.070)	 (0.078)	 (0.214)	 (0.075)	N	 3269	 3269	 3269	 3269	 3191	Log-likelihood	 -3538.654	 -3537.951	 -3528.958	 -3529.402	 -3446.214	*	p<0.05,	**	p<0.01,	***	p<0.001	Note:	Although	there	are	some	significant	results	in	these	tables,	for	example,	35-44-year-olds	in	Germany	are	more	likely	to	be	in	the	positive	frame	group,	these	do	not	affect	our	results	as	can	be	seen	when	we	control	for	these	variables	(see	Table	A1).	 	
60		
Table	A9.	Descriptive	statistics	–	Germany	(%)			 Negative	frame	 Positive	frame	 Control	group	
Age	 		 		 		18-24	 8.8	 7.8	 9.5	25-34	 14.6	 17	 16.3	35-44	 14.4	 15.2	 13.3	45-54	 18.3	 16.5	 18.8	Over	55	 44.1	 43.5	 42.1			 		 		 		Male	 47.2	 49	 50.3	Female	 52.8	 51	 49.7			 		 		 		
Past	vote	 		 		 		CDU/CSU	 28.2	 25.4	 24.6	SPD	 18.1	 17.9	 20.6	Die	Linke	 6.6	 6.5	 6.6	Grüne	 7.1	 6	 6.3	FDP	 4.3	 3.4	 3.2	AfD	 3.8	 3.6	 2.9	Other	 3.7	 4.9	 4.6	Non-voter	 28.3	 32.4	 31.1			 		 		 		No	qualifications	 3.7	 3.8	 4.4	Still	training	 2.4	 3.2	 2.6	Still	studying	 44.8	 4.6	 4	Vocational	degree	 59.1	 61.5	 59.6	University	degree	 30	 26.9	 29.4			 		 		 		Full-time	 38.04	 37.06	 35.7	P/T	8-29	hours	p/w	 8.71	 8.36	 9.25	P/T	less	than	8	hours	p/w	 0.89	 0.72	 0.85	Not	working	 52.36	 53.86	 54.2			 		 		 		
Anti-welfare	 		 		 		No	 49.5	 53.3	 52.9	Yes	 50.5	 46.7	 47.1			 		 		 		
Anti-immigration	 		 		 		No	 74.4	 75.1	 77	Yes	 25.6	 24.9	 23			 		 		 		
Economically	secure	 		 		 		Yes	 64	 62	 60	No	 36	 38	 40		Table	A10.	Descriptive	statistics	–	Sweden	(%)			 Negative	frame	 Positive	frame	 Control	group	Age	(mean)	 45.9	 46.3	 46.7	
61		
		 		 		 		Male	 49.2	 53.3	 53	Female	 50.8	 46.7	 47			 		 		 		
Past	vote	 		 		 		Moderates	 16.4	 17.5	 17.1	Centre	Party	 2.8	 3.6	 3.5	Liberals		 4.9	 6.2	 6.1	Christian	Democrats	 3.1	 2.3	 3.7	Greens	 5.5	 5.7	 5.6	Social	Democrats	 19.8	 19.9	 20.2	Left	Party	 5.7	 7.7	 5.4	Feminist	Initiative	 3.2	 2.1	 3.5	Sweden	Democrats	 20.9	 17.2	 18.1	Other	 1.5	 1.2	 1.5	Non-voter	 2.6	 3.8	 3.2	None	of	the	above	 1.4	 2.4	 1.8	No	right	to	vote	 4.1	 3.8	 2.6	Don’t	know	 1.2	 0.8	 1.6	Don’t	want	to	say	 6.9	 6	 6.3			 		 		 		Elementary	school	(ref.)	 7.06	 6.78	 7.3	Secondary	school	 33.9	 26.36	 31.09	Post-secondary	 5.83	 6.02	 7.3	Post-secondary	vocational	 10.43	 9.04	 8.03	University,	1-2	years	 8.74	 9.64	 9.2	University,	3-4	years	 19.63	 26.51	 22.04	University,	5	years	or	more	 11.81	 14.01	 12.85	Doctorate	 1.84	 0.9	 1.31	Rather	not	say	 0.77	 0.75	 0.88			 		 		 		Working	full-time	 54.6	 49	 48.8	Working	part-time	(8-29	hours)	 10.4	 10.1	 11.5	Working	part-time	(less	than	8	hours)	 4.1	 3.8	 6.7	Student	 9.2	 11.6	 8.8	Pensioner	 16.9	 19.6	 19.3	Seeking	work	 3.7	 4.5	 3.7	Does	not	work	at	all	 1.1	 1.4	 1.2			 		 		 		Anti-welfare	 		 		 		No	 57.8	 63.3	 60	Yes	 42.2	 36.7	 40			 		 		 		Anti-immigration	 		 		 		No	 69.6	 66	 71.2	Yes	 30.4	 34	 28.8			 		 		 		
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Economically	secure	 		 		 		Yes	 64.7	 61.7	 61.8	No	 35.3	 38.3	 38.2			Table	A11.	Descriptive	statistics	–	UK	(%)			 Negative	frame	 Positive	frame	 Control	group	Age	(mean)	 48.2	 48.5	 48.1	
        Male	 45.4	 46.2	 45.8	Female	 54.6	 53.8	 54.2			 		 		 		
Past	vote	2017	 		 		 		Conservative	 32.2	 36	 34.8	Labour	 38.8	 36	 36.4	Lib	Dem	 7.2	 7.5	 7.1	Scots	Nats.	 4.3	 2.7	 4.1	Plaid	Cymru	 0.6	 0.6	 0.5	UKIP	 1.5	 2	 2.2	Green	 2.1	 1	 2.1	Other	 1.6	 1.2	 1.2	Don't	know	 1.2	 1	 0.8	Not	asked	 10.4	 12.2	 10.9			 		 		 		No	qualifications	 6.8	 5.7	 4.78	Vocational	 10.3	 12.04	 10.46	Secondary	 29.6	 34.08	 32.46	Tertiary	 49.8	 45	 49.59	Don't	know	 3.6	 3.17	 2.71			 		 		 		Working	full	time	 41.77	 40.88	 41.54	Working	part	time	(8-29	hours	a	week)	 14.68	 11.94	 15.17	Working	part	time	(Less	than	8	hours)	 1.98	 1.91	 1.3	Full	time	student	 5.64	 6.59	 6.66	Retired	 23.8	 26.55	 25.35	Unemployed	 3.48	 3.72	 2.5	Not	working	 8.65	 8.4	 7.49			 		 		 		
Anti-welfare	 		 		 		No	 60	 62.6	 59.6	Yes	 40	 37.4	 40.4			 		 		 		
Anti-immigration	 		 		 		No	 67.9	 66.2	 67.6	Yes	 32.1	 33.8	 32.3			 		 		 		
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Economically	secure	 		 		 		Yes	 54.7	 51.9	 56.6	No	 45.3	 48.1	 43.4		 	
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Table	A12.	The	effect	of	framing	and	newspaper	readership		 Germany	 Sweden	 UK	No	Frame	(ref.)	 	 	 				Negative	frame	 -0.342***	(0.083)	 .9897	***	(.2842	)			 -.5545***	(.1039)				Positive	frame	 -0.114	(0.0879)	 -.2619	(.2505)				 -.1169	(.1025)	Anti-immigration	papers	 0.013	(0.120)	 	 -.4339***	(.1467)	Negative	frame*anti-immigration	papers	 -0.120	(0.178)	 	 -.3787	(.2138)	Positive	frame*anti-immigration	papers	 -0.092	(0.167)	 	 -.0801	(.1972)	Expressen	 	 .0226				(.0959)			 			Goteborg’s	Posten	 	 .0506					(.0873)					 			Svenska	Dagbladet	 	 -.1100			(.0937)					 		Negative	frame	X	Expressen	 	 -.0440			(.1331)	 	Positive	frame	X	Expressen	 	 -.0078				(.1252)			 	Negative	frame	X	Goteborg’s	Posten	 	 .1109					(.1156)		 	Positive	frame	X	Goteborg’s	Posten	 	 .0678				(.1095)						 	Negative	frame	X	Svenska	Dagbladet	 	 .0906				(.1208)					 	Positive	frame	X	Svenska	Dagbladet	 	 -.0422				(.1252)					 	Cut	1	 -0.594***	(0.058)	 -.5942			(.1768)																						-1.0598	(.0774)	Cut	2	 0.720***	(0.058)	 .6920				(.1784)																							-.0156	(.0734)	N	 4,158	 2001	 3269	Log-likelihood	 -4518.664	 -2152.365	 -3401.008			*P<0.05,	**p<0.01,	***p<0.001	Note:	Data	on	newspaper	readership	in	Sweden	is	on	a	scale	0-7	for	how	many	days	per	week	respondents	read	a	particular	paper.	The	three	papers	here	were	selected	as	being	more	associated	with	anti-immigration	messages.				 	
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Ethical	considerations		This	project	was	assessed	as	“minimal	risk”	following	the	risk	assessment	tool	at	[university	name	redacted	for	review].	The	Research	Ethics	Number	for	the	project	is	MR/16/17-370	[Note:	the	official	letter	of	confirmation	contains	details	of	the	researcher	which	would	compromise	the	anonymity	of	the	review	process.	This	can	be	provided	to	the	editor	on	request].			The	principal	ethical	consideration	with	the	project	was	whether	deception	would	be	used	in	either	the	negative	or	positive	frames.	However,	one	of	the	premises	of	the	project	is	that	the	impact	of	migrants	on	public	finances	is	contestable.	Before	fielding	the	experiments,	we	ensured	that	research	existed	that	would	support	the	interpretation	of	both	the	negative	and	positive	frames	in	each	country.	Put	simply,	we	found	credible	research	that	could	support	the	proposition	that	migrants	were	a	net	cost	to	the	public	purse	and	net	contributors	in	each	country.	As	a	result,	neither	the	respondents	in	the	negative	nor	the	positive	group	were	given	false	information.	Some	of	the	studies	used	as	the	evidential	basis	for	the	frames	in	each	country	are	provided	below.	Nevertheless,	all	respondents	in	each	country	were	also	informed	by	YouGov	immediately	after	the	survey	that	the	questions	relating	to	this	research	were	part	of	an	academic	experiment.				
Germany		Positive	frame:		Fiskalische	Wirkungen	der	Zuwanderung	(2015).	Institut	fuer	Arbeitsmarkt	und	Berufsforschung	der	Bundesagentur	fuer	Arbeit,	Nuernberg,	6/2015.		Negative	frame:		Hans-Werner	Sinn	(2016)	So	kann	es	nicht	weitergehen.	Ifo	Schnelldienst	69(4):	3-6.			OECD	(2013)	The	fiscal	impact	of	immigration	in	OECD	countries,	International	Migration	
Outlook	2013,	OECD	Publishing,	Paris			
Sweden		Positive	frame:		OECD	(2013)	The	fiscal	impact	of	immigration	in	OECD	countries,	International	Migration	
Outlook	2013,	OECD	Publishing,	Paris		Negative	frame:		Ruist,	J.	(2015)	The	fiscal	cost	of	refugee	immigration:	The	example	of	Sweden,	Population	and	
Development	Review,	41(4),	pp	567-581		
United	Kingdom		Positive	frame:		Dustmann,	C.	and	Frattini,	T.	(2014)	The	fiscal	effects	of	immigration	to	the	UK,	The	Economic	
Journal,	124(580),	pp	F593-F643		
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Negative	frame:		Migration	Watch	(2014)	An	Assessment	of	the	Fiscal	Impact	of	Immigration	to	the	UK,	Migration	Watch	UK,	London		An	overview	of	studies	showing	both	negative	and	positive	fiscal	impact	of	immigration	in	the	UK	can	be	found	at	https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/the-fiscal-impact-of-immigration-in-the-uk/					
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